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CASENOTES
INDIAN LAW - Indian Tribes Have No Inherent
Authority to Exercise Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-
Indians Violating Tribal Criminal Laws Within
Reservation Boundaries - Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
In their quest for greater autonomy and self-determination, American
Indians have recently attempted to exercise a greater measure of legal au-
thority over non-Indians residing on Indian reservations. ' Since American
I. Most Indian tribes have functioning governments in some form, but the scope of
their power varies from tribe to tribe. See generally American Indian Lawyer Training Pro-
gram, Indian Tribes As Governments (1975) (publication of limited circulation available at
the American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Washington, D.C.). Many tribes organized
governments pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477
(1976), which allowed tribes to adopt a constitution and by-laws or incorporate under fed-
eral supervision. See generally V. DELORIA JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES
187 (Delta ed. 1974). Others, such as the Pueblos in New Mexico, continue to operate some
form of their traditional government. See J. SANDO, THE PUEBLO INDIANS 8 (1976). Tradi-
tional governments differ widely in structure and organization, but generally may be distin-
guished from governments formed under the Reorganization Act in their method of
selecting tribal leaders.
The 1970 Census set the Indian population in the United States at 792,730. Many people
believe the actual number today to be close to one million. I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
Twenty-eight percent live on reservations ranging in size from the 15.4 million acre Navajo
Reservation in Arizona to the one-quarter acre Golden Hill Reservation in Connecticut.
Forty-six percent live in urban areas. 1d at 90-91. Indian land comprises more than 50
million acres, excluding Alaska. Id at 99. There are 268 reservations created by treaty or
Executive Order and several created by state action. Id at 90.
The Indian's unique legal status is defined by a voluminous and complex body of treaties,
federal statutes, administrative regulations and federal and state judicial decisions generally
granting special rights as members of organized, federally recognized tribes. See, e.g., Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)(Indian preference in Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring
practices under 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) is constitutional); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908)(the right to use sufficient water from the Milk River for irrigation purposes is
implied in the Agreement of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113 (1888) with the Gros Ventre tribe);
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), motion denied, 66 F.R.D.
477 (W.D. Wash. 1974), afj'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 1086,
rehearing denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976)(provision in treaties with certain Northwest tribes
reserving the "right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations. ."
means that members of those tribes have the right to 50o of the harvestable fish from their
customary fishing areas, even if outside the reservation). See generally F. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1971); M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1973).
Although the total percentages of non-Indian owned land and non-ndian populations on
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courts have consistently held that Indian tribes possess certain attributes of
inherent sovereignty, retained until relinquished by treaty or extinguished
by Congress, 2 a significant number of Indian court systems functioning on
reservations today3 purport to extend criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans violating tribal criminal laws while residing within reservation bound-
aries.4 Because federal law does not specifically authorize the exercise of
such authority,5 these tribal assertions of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians have been based on claims of inherent sovereignty within reserva-
tion territory. 6 Last term, the Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish
reservations are not available, non-Indians own much Indian reservation land and comprise
a substantial part of the total reservation population in some areas. Figures for individual
reservations have been compiled by the National Tribal Chairmen's Association. See Brief
for National Tribal Chairmen's Association as Amicus Curiae at Appendix, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Chairmen's Ass'n Brief].
2. See cases discussed in notes 22-70 and accompanying text infra.
3. The 127 tribal courts fall into the following categories: 71 tribal courts established
under the tribe's inherent legislative power; 30 courts established under federal regulations,
25 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1978); 16 courts of the traditional Pueblos; and 10 conservation courts.
See Chairmen's Ass'n Brief, supra note 1 at 34-35. For general information about modem
Indian court systems, see S. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS (1978).
4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). During the first half of 1977, tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs
law enforcement authorities arrested over 300 non-Indians, representing 2.1% of all arrests
on Indian reservations. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, TRIBAL AND
BUREAU OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES AUTOMATED REPORT, JAN. 1, 1977 TO JUNE 30,
1977.
5. Under federal statute, jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed on Indian
reservations by Indians is vested in the federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The statute
covers the following offenses: murder, manslaughter; kidnapping; rape; carnal knowledge of
any female not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years; assault with intent to
commit rape; incest; assault with intent to commit murder; assault with a dangerous weapon;
assault resulting in serious bodily injury; arson; burglary; robbery; and larceny. Two cases
have held that federal jurisdiction over these crimes is exclusive. Felicia v. United States,
495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974); Sam v. United States, 385
F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1967). Jurisdiction over minor offenses not covered under 18 U.S.C. §
1153, such as traffic offenses, trespass, violations of tribal hunting and fishing regulations,
disorderly conduct and simple assault are governed by tribal criminal laws. See, e.g., Su-
QUAMISH LAW AND ORDER CODE, ch. III. Brief for Petitioners at 22a, Oliphant v. Suquam-
ish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). This jurisdiction, however, is limited by the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1341 (1976). Section 1302 specifies six months
in jail or a $500 fine or both as the maximum penalty an Indian court may impose for
conviction.
6. In international law, sovereignty is defined as the supreme authority to govern peo-
ple and territory. See I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as OPPENHEIM]. In its external aspects, sovereignty is the power of a state to maintain
relations with other states. In its internal aspects, sovereignty is the power of a state over all
individuals and property within its territory. Personal sovereignty is the power of a state to
exercise authority over its citizens living within or without its territorial boundaries. Id at
254-56.
Casenotes
Indian Tribe7 refused to recognize these well-established principles of in-
herent and retained sovereignty and held that Indian courts have no au-
thority to punish non-Indians committing criminal acts on the reservation.
The controversy culminating in Oliphant began in 1973 when the Su-
quamish Tribe in the State of Washington enacted a Law and Order Code
that extended criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 8 Pursuant to this ju-
risdiction, tribal police officers in 1973 and 1974 arrested two non-Indian
residents of the Tribe's Port Madison Reservation for assault and reck-
lessly endangering another person.9 Both defendants sought habeas
corpus relief in the district court for the Western District of Washington,
attacking the Tribe's authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. The district court denied relief, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 0 The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the power of the Suquamish Tribe to try and punish non-Indians was
an attribute of inherent sovereignty, its authority neither extinguished by
Congress nor voluntarily relinquished by treaty. "
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed. The
Court found that the Suquamish tribal court, established pursuant to tribal
legislative authority, possessed no inherent power to try and punish non-
Indian violators of tribal criminal laws.' 2 Reasoning that Indian tribes
submitted to the sovereignty of the United States when their lands were
incorporated into the territory of the United States, the Court concluded
that jurisdiction over non-Indians could not be assumed absent specific
congressional authorization.' 3
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued for
affirmance. Absent an affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, he
maintained that Indian tribes have the right to try and punish all persons
violating tribal laws within the reservation. '4 As examination of the appli-
cable law and policy considerations will show, the dissent conforms to es-
tablished case law recognizing the inherent and retained sovereignty of
7. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
8. SUQUAMISH LAW AND ORDER CODE, Art. III. The Code extended criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians for all crimes except those covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. See
note 5, supra.
9. The Port Madison Reservation consists of over 7,000 acres, two-thirds of which are
owned by non-Indians. The Reservation has a non-Indian population of approximately
3,000 and an Indian population of approximately 50. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978).
10. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976).
11. Id at 1010-12.
12. 435 U.S. at 212.
13. Id. at 209.
14. Id at 212. Justice Brennan did not participate.
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Indian tribes. In contrast, the majority misused legal precedent and en-
gaged in an unprincipled use of legislative materials to reach its opposite
conclusion.
I. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
A. State Jurisdiction
Indian tribes were organized political entities with distinct governmen-
tal, social, and economic systems long before Europeans came to the
United States. Most tribes had laws regulating property rights, domestic
relations, crimes, and relations with other Indian governments,' 5 along
with effective mechanisms for enforcement of these tribal laws.16 It is not
surprising, therefore, that European countries dealing with Indian tribes
before the creation of the United States treated them as sovereign nations.
The existence of treaties between Indian tribes and European nations as
well as those between Indian tribes and the United States evidences the
sovereign character of the tribes. 17
15. See Kickingbird, "'n Our Image. After Our Likeness.:" The Drivefor the Assimi-
lation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 675, 677 (1976).
16. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdic-
tional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503, 553 (1976). Although most tribes lacked formal, written
legal codes and constitutions, some developed highly sophisticated and complex governmen-
tal institutions. The Iroquois, for example, promulgated and adopted the Great Binding
Law of the Five Nations which established a confederate form of government among five
culturally-related Indian nations. See L. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE Ho-DE-NO-SAu-NEE
OR IROQUOIS (1901).
17. See, e.g., 2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 712
(1858). It is estimated that over 800 treaties were made with Indian nations by European
governments and the United States. Institute for the Development of Indian Law, Indian
Sovereignty 6 (1978) (publication of limited circulation available at the Institute for the
Development of Indian Law, Washington, D.C.)[hereinafter cited as Indian Sovereignty].
Under principles of international law, only sovereign nations are empowered to enter into
treaties. OPPENHEIM supra note 6, at 795.
Indian treaties have played an important role in the development of Indian law. Federal
policies such as removal, "civilization," assimilation, and self-determination have been im-
plemented through treaties. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
33-67 (1971). Indian treaties are the "supreme law of the land" and have the same force and
dignity as a federal statute. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 559 (1832). Congress declared an end to formal treaty-making with Indian tribes in
1871. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)). The
United States continued to make agreements with Indian tribes, however, until 1911. These
agreements required approval of both houses of Congress. Indian Sovereignty, supra at 12.
Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress may abrogate Indian treaties unilaterally.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See note 18 infra. See generally Wilkinson &
Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation." "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass
Grows Upon the Earth'--How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975). It is well
established that a treaty is not a grant of rights to the tribe from the United States, but rather
[Vol. 28:663
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Although American courts consistently have recognized certain attrib-
utes of tribal sovereignty, the courts have also held that Congress has ple-
nary, or almost absolute power to legislate in Indian affairs. '8 Courts have
refused to consider whether this plenary power exceeds congressional au-
thority under the Constitution, characterizing the issue as a political ques-
tion and placing it beyond the scope of judicial review under separation of
powers principles.' 9 Consequently, no court has viewed Indian sover-
eignty as a limitation on Congress' legislative power. Thus, under United
States law, Indian tribes are sovereign only to the extent Congress allows
them to be. 20
Indian sovereignty has received deference, however, in cases in which
states have attempted to exercise civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations
without express authorization by Congress. 21 Chief Justice John Mar-
a grant from the tribe to the United States and a reservation of all inherent rights and pow-
ers not granted. See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
18. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). At issue in Lone Wolf was
the validity of Congressional ratification of an agreement for the sale of land by the Kiowa
Tribe to the United States which had been executed in violation of an earlier treaty requir-
ing all future land sales to be approved by three-fourths of the adult male members of the
Tribe. The Court upheld Congress' action on the ground that "[p]lenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government." 187 U.S. at 565.
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-26 (1962); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
568 (1903) See note 18 supra. The political question doctrine places beyond the scope of
judicial review certain questions committed by the Constitution to the legislative or execu-
tive branch for determination. See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Ques-
tion. A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). For a discussion of the plenary power
doctrine and political question doctrine as applied to Indian affairs, see Coulter, The Denial
of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations Under United States Law, 3 AM. INDIAN J. 5 (1977).
But cf. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)(the political question
doctrine does not prevent the Court from determining whether Indian legislation violates
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment).
20. Congress has eroded Indian sovereignty on several occasions. For example, Con-
gress has vested federal courts with jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by
Indians on reservations, which, as a practical matter divested the tribes of such jurisdiction.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). Similarly, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 forbids tribal
laws from violating certain constitutional provisions and limits the maximum penalties In-
dian courts may impose. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976). See generally Comment, Inherent Indian
Sovereignty, 4 AM. IND. L. REV. 311 (1976).
21. Congress has authorized states to assume jurisdiction in certain cases. Under Public
Law 280, enacted in 1953, 12 states have assumed some measure of criminal and civil juris-
diction over all or most of the Indian land within their boundaries. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch.
505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). For six states-Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin-the assumption of jurisdiction was mandatory. Section seven of the Act
authorized any other state to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction by express enactment of
its legislature. Section seven also gave congressional consent to the repeal of disclaimers of
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shall's now famous opinions in two cases involving the Cherokee Nation
established the governing principles in this area, which, with slight modifi-
cation, remain the law today. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,22 the Chero-
kee Nation sued in the United States Supreme Court for an injunction to
restrain Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee Territory. The
threshold jurisdictional issue was whether the Cherokee Nation consti-
tuted a "foreign state" under Article III of the Constitution, which ex-
tended the Court's original jurisdiction to controversies "between a State
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. ' 23 Mar-
shall held that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the framers of the
Constitution, when they adopted Article III, did not intend to include In-
dian nations within the meaning of the term "foreign States."'24 Cherokee
Nation, however, does not stand for the proposition that Indian tribes are
not nations. On the contrary, Marshall expressly recognized their national
character:
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character
of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, sepa-
rated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and gov-
erning itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges been
completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a
state from the settlement of our country. 25
The question left unanswered in Cherokee Nation-whether Georgia
law could be enforced within the territory of the Cherokees--came before
the Court again in Worcester v. Georgia.26 Worcester, a citizen of Vermont
and a resident of the Cherokee Territory, was convicted by a Georgia court
of violating a state law prohibiting non-Indians from residing within the
territorial boundaries of the Cherokee Nation without first obtaining a li-
jurisdiction over Indian lands contained in the constitutions of a number of Western states.
Six states-Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Washington-assumed some
measure of jurisdiction under these sections. Federal law now requires tribal consent before
a state may assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, § 406, 82 Stat.
80, 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976). See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280. The Limits of State
Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975). Other states assert
jurisdiction under a specific federal statute. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13, 1950, ch. 947, 64 Stat.
845 (New York 1950).
22. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19. Marshall reasoned that Indian nations could not be consid-
ered foreign to the United States for the simple reason that many tribes were geographically
surrounded by the boundaries of the United States. Id. at 17.
25. Id at 16. While recognizing the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation, Marshall, in
dicta, characterized Indian tribes as "domestic, dependent nations." Id at 17.
26. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
[Vol, 28:663
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cense from state authorities.27 Worcester sued for a writ of error, arguing
that because treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United States
recognized the right of the Cherokee Nation to govern itself without inter-
ference from states, the law under which he had been convicted was un-
constitutional. 28 The Court held that the laws of Georgia could have no
force within Cherokee Territory for three reasons. First, the Court recog-
nized Indian tribes as "distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries within which their authority is exclusive .... -29 Second,
Georgia's assertion of jurisdiction over Indian lands forcibly interfered
with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation, "the regulation of which are committed exclusively to the govern-
ment of the union . . . " by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 30 Fi-
nally, Georgia's actions also conflicted with treaties establishing the
territorial boundaries of the Cherokee Nation and guaranteeing to them
all land contained therein.31
Despite Worcester's basic policy of tribal sovereignty, states have exer-
cised jurisdiction over reservations in criminal cases involving only non-
Indians. In United States v. McBratney,32 for example, the Court recog-
27. The statute read in pertinent part:
all white persons, residing within the limits of the Cheerokee nation on the 1st day
of March next, or at any time thereafter, without a license or permit from his excel-
lency the governor,. . . shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour, and upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by confinement to the penitentiary, at hard labour,
for a term not less than four years.
Id at 542.
28. Id at 538-39.
29. Id at 557.
30. Id at 561. Article I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562. The Court relied principally on the Treaty of Hopewell,
November 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 (1785), and the Treaty of Holston, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39
(1791). The Treaty of Holston delineates the boundary between the territory of the Cher-
okees and that of the United States (Article IV) and declares that the "United States sol-
emnly guarantee[s] to the Cherokee nation, all their lands not hereby ceded." (Article VII).
Article IX provided that no United States citizen could travel through Cherokee territory
without a passport obtained from an authorized United States official. After reviewing the
various treaty provisions, the Court concluded that Georgia's attempt to assert jurisdiction
over Cherokee territory was:
in direct hostility with treaties, repeated in a succession of years, which mark out
the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia; guaranty to them
all their land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States
to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing
power of the nation to govern itself.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-62.
32. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
1979]
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nized the jurisdiction of Colorado tribunals to prosecute a murder of one
non-Indian by another committed on a reservation within the state. Mc-
Bratney and its progeny,33 however, should not be read to erode Worces-
ter's basic policy. Because the disputes involved non-Indians exclusively,
the tribal courts did not attempt to assert jurisdiction. Rather, the jurisdic-
tional dispute in each case was between a state and federal court. Further-
more, the United States Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction over Indian lands in Williams v.
Lee.34 Lee, a non-Indian, operated a store on the Navajo Reservation
under a license required by federal law.35 He brought suit in a superior
court of Arizona against a Navajo man and his wife to collect payment for
goods sold to them on credit. The United States Supreme Court held that
the suit should have been dismissed because the Navajo tribal court was
the proper forum to adjudicate civil disputes arising on the reservation,
even when a non-Indian was involved. Arizona courts could not entertain
the suit because "to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would un-
dermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and
hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. 36
Although the principle of inherent sovereignty as established in Chero-
kee Nation and Worcester remains intact, other legal theories have
emerged as a primary basis for modem jurisdictional decisions. McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Commission37 marks the transition from reliance
on inherent sovereignty to a focus on treaties and federal statutes as a basis
for limiting state jurisdiction. Arizona sought to collect its state income tax
33. See, e.g., New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946)(affirming state court
conviction of a non-Indian for the murder of a non-Indian on the Allegany Reservation);
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896)ourisdiction over a crime committed on Indian
lands by and against non-Indians properly lies in the state courts). This line of cases has
come to be known as the McBratney trilogy. See Clinton, supra note 16 at 524.
34. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 262 (1976) provides:
Any person desiring to trade with the Indians on any Indian reservation shall,
upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs, that he is a proper person to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so
under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may pre-
scribe for the protection of said Indians.
Trade regulation statutes are intended to protect Indians from exploitation by unethical
traders. See generally Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1971); F. PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1962).
36. 358 U.S. at 223. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179
(1973), the Court limited the applicability of the Williams infringement test to situations
involving non-Indians. For further discussion of McClanahan, see notes 37-44 and accom-
panying text infra.
37. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
[Vol. 28:663
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from a Navajo woman whose income was derived solely from reservation
sources.38 Noting a recent trend toward less reliance on inherent sover-
eignty as a bar to state jurisdiction, 39 the Supreme Court reasoned that an
1868 treaty guaranteeing the Navajos the right to self-government, 40 and
certain federal statutes, 4' left the regulation of conduct on the reservation
exclusively to the federal government and the tribe and held the tax ille-
gal.42 Although declining to base its decision squarely on the doctrine of
Indian sovereignty, the McClanahan Court admitted that "it would vastly
oversimplify the problem to say that nothing remains of the notion that
reservation Indians are a separate people to whom state jurisdiction...
may not extend. '' 43 Instead, the Court used the doctrine of Indian sover-
eignty as an aid to statutory and treaty interpretation: "The Indian sover-
eignty doctrine is relevant . . . not because it provides a definitive
resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop
38. Appellant McClanahan had $16.20 withheld from her wages for 1967 to cover her
state income tax liability pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-188(f)(Supp. 1972-73).
Id at 166. Arizona claimed a tax liability of $11.84. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
In that case, Arizona's sales tax was held inapplicable to the Warren Trading Post Company,
operating a retail business on the Navajo Reservation under a license granted by the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, on the ground that "Congress has taken the business of Indian
trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws . Id at
690.
40. The Navajo Treaty of June 1, 1868, Art. IV, 15 Stat. 667, provided that a reservation
would be set aside "for the use and occupation of the Navajo Tribe of Indians" and that "no
person except those herein so authorized . . . shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article." Applying the rule of construction
that ambiguous treaty provisions must be resolved in favor of the Indians, Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930), the Court concluded that this treaty provision "was meant to
establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal
supervision." 411 U.S. at 175.
41. The Court relied on the Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, § 20, 36 Stat.
557 (1910)(Arizona disclaimed all right and title to Indian lands lying within its borders); the
Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105, 109 (1976)(states are authorized to impose an income tax on
residents of federal areas contained within the state with the exception of Indians living on
Indian lands); and Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)(states may assume jurisdiction over
Indian lands but only with tribal consent).
42. 411 U.S. at 165. The Court reasoned that in the Buck Act, supra note 41, "Congress
would not have jealously protected the immunity of reservation Indians from state income
taxes had it thought that the States had residual power to impose such taxes in any event."
Id at 177. Furthermore, with regard to Public Law 280, supra note 41, the Court found that
Congress would not have required tribal consent if states had been free to assume jurisdic-
tion unilaterally by simple legislative enactment. The Court concluded that Arizona could
not apply its income tax to the Navajos absent congressional authorization of state jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 178.
43. Id. at 170.
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against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.""
Thus, the McClanahan approach to Indian sovereignty is merely a recog-
nition of the practical reality underlying federal Indian law. Conse-
quently, it has become largely unnecessary to resort to notions of inherent
sovereignty to resolve state jurisdictional disputes since in almost every
case, the decision may be based on treaties or federal statutes. Nowhere,
however, does McClanahan suggest that resort to the doctrine of Indian
sovereignty would be inappropriate if treaties or statutes fail to furnish the
basis for decision.45
B. Tribal Power
The doctrine of Indian sovereignty also provides the legal foundation
for the exercise of self-government by an Indian tribe.46 Because Indian
tribes are "distinct, independent political communities," 47 they are entitled
to govern themselves. In decisions in which the right to exercise tribal
powers was at issue, courts have consistently relied on two premises. First,
an Indian tribe's powers of government derive from an inherent sover-
eignty, rather than from a delegation of authority by the federal govern-
ment. Second, an Indian tribe possesses residual sovereignty-it retains all
powers of a sovereign nation except when expressly relinquished by treaty
agreement or expressly extinguished by Congress. 48
The principle that Indian tribes possess inherent rather than delegated
powers dictated the Supreme Court's ruling in Talton v. Mayes.49 In Tal-
ton, an Indian had been tried and convicted in a special Supreme Court of
the Cherokee Nation for the murder of another Indian within Cherokee
territory. He filed a habeas corpus petition in the District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, alleging that he had been indicted and tried
in violation of certain fifth amendment rights. Relying on Chief Justice
John Marshall's landmark opinions in the early Cherokee Nation cases,
the Court reasoned that the fifth amendment did not apply to governmen-
tal actions of the Cherokee Nation because their powers were not created
44. Id at 172.
45. The doctrine of Indian sovereignty retains vitality in state jurisdiction cases, espe-
cially when all the parties are Indians. Fisher v. District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial
Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382 (1976)(Montana courts have no jurisdiction over adoption pro-
ceedings in which all parties are Indians because state court jurisdiction would plainly inter-
fere with the self-government of the Northern Cheyenne).
46. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See notes 22-33 and accompanying text supra.
47. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
48. See cases discussed in notes 53-60 and accompanying text infra.
49. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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by the Constitution, but rather existed prior to its adoption.50 Applying
similar reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in
Buster v. Wright that the Creek Nation possessed inherent authority to tax
non-Indians trading within its borders.5 The court stated that the author-
ity of the Creek Nation to enact the tax did not originate in a federal stat-
ute, treaty or agreement. Rather, the power derived from the "inherent
and essential attributes of its original sovereignty." 52
Once the inherent sovereignty of a tribe is recognized, courts must deter-
mine whether tribal powers have been relinquished through treaties or re-
moved by Congress through statutes.53 All powers not expressly taken
50. See also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958)(constitutional
limitations of the fourteenth amendment are inapplicable to the legislative actions of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe because it is not a creature of state government). But see Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1341 (1976). The Act reads in pertinent part:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500 or
both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976). Although the Act makes most constitutional guarantees applicable
to Indian governments, it is not coextensive with the Bill of Rights. See notes 126, 128 and
accompanying text infra.
51. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
52. 135 F. at 950.
53. In Buster v. Wright, the Eighth Circuit recognized that "every original attribute of
the government of the Creek Nation still exists intact which has not been destroyed or lim-
ited by Act of Congress or by the contracts of the Creek tribe itself." 135 F. at 950. And in
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916), the Supreme Court said that the power to
regulate the domestic relations of tribal members is vested in the tribal government unless
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away by Congress or given up by the tribe itself are retained under the
principle of residual sovereignty. A cardinal principle in judicial interpre-
tation of treaties and statutes under the principle of residual sovereignty is
that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the tribes. 54 Thus, Indian
sovereignty may be limited only upon a clear showing of Congressional
intent to extinguish or tribal intent to relinquish tribal powers. 55
Applying this analytical framework of residual sovereignty, the courts
have validated the tribal power to regulate the use and disposition of indi-
vidual property among its members; 56 to administer a criminal justice sys-
tem;57 to tax non-Indians doing business within reservation boundaries;5
to determine the extent to which the right to vote will be exercised in tribal
elections;59 and to exclude non-Indian trespassers from the reservation. 60
Moreover, courts have relied on the general principles of inherent and
residual sovereignty to sanction Indian jurisdiction over non-Indians as
well as Indians living or doing business within the reservation. 6' In Buster
v. Wright, the appellate court cited the general principle of international
law that a sovereign nation's power extends to all the inhabitants of its
territory. 62 Additionally, in holding that the tribal court is the proper fo-
rum for adjudicating claims by non-Indians against Indians for nonpay-
Congress clearly directs otherwise. See also Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958).
54. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Settler v. Lameer,
507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
55. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)("the intention to
abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress"); United States v.
Santa Fe R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 17.
56. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
57. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512
F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
59. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1974).
60. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). Indian sover-
eignty also has been recognized in other contexts. An Indian tribe possesses sufficient in-
dependent authority over its internal affairs to accord absolute privilege to its officers for acts
committed within an area of tribal control. Davis v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968).
Provided the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1341 (1976), is not violated,
an Indian tribe may structure its government in any form, even if the power to interpret
tribal laws is vested in a tribal council rather than a tribal court. Howlett v. Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976). As sovereign entities, Indian tribes enjoy
immunity from suit. They may be sued only with their consent or the consent of Congress.
Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1975).
61. See, e.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975); Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
62. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appealdismirsed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
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ment of goods, the Supreme Court in Williams suggested that the race of
the parties is not a relevant consideration in Indian jurisdictional cases: "It
is immaterial that Respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reserva-
tion and the transaction with an Indian took place there."'63 Furthermore,
the Court has rejected the argument that the exercise of tribal authority
over non-Indians is inappropriate because non-Indians are not eligible to
participate in tribal government. 64
The principle that the powers of Indian tribes exist independent of con-
gressional grant or treaty recognition was most recently reaffirmed in
United States v. Mazurie.65 Pursuant to legislation allowing Indian tribes
to regulate the introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian reserva-
tions,66 the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes enacted an ordinance requiring
a tribal license for all retail liquor outlets within the reservation. The
Mazuries' application for a license was denied, but they continued to oper-
ate the bar, prompting the initiation of criminal proceedings. The district
court entered judgments of conviction but the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed, invalidating the delegation of congressional au-
thority and maintaining that Indian tribes are merely private voluntary
organizations with no governmental authority.67 In a unanimous decision,
the Supreme Court upheld the delegation of authority to Indian tribes to
regulate the introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian reservations.
The Court reasoned that restrictions on congressional authority to delegate
legislative power decreases when the entity exercising the delegated au-
thority possesses independent authority over the subject matter.68 The
Court upheld the delegation of authority in Mazurie because Indian tribes
"possess a certain degree of independent authority over matters that affect
the internal and social relations of tribal life."' 69 The Court likewise reaf-
firmed that the authority of Indian tribes as "unique aggregations possess-
ing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,"
may properly extend to non-Indians doing business within the reserva-
63. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
64. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975).
65. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976). The statute provided that 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (1976), which
establishes criminal penalities for the introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian reser-
vations, would not apply when there had been compliance with tribal ordinances regulating
alcoholic beverages.
67. 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
68. 419 U.S. at 556-57 (citing United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319-22 (1936)).
69. 419 U.S. at 557.
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tion.70 Mazurie, therefore, embodies the teachings of a long line of cases
establishing the inherent authority of Indian governments as both territo-
rial and personal in nature. Furthermore, it completes a series of cases
affirming that tribal powers are retained until relinquished through treaties
or removed by federal legislation.
II. OLIPHANT: A BLOW TO INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Central to the Court's opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is
that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by Indian tribes
is inconsistent with their status as political entities completely under the
sovereignty of the United States.71 The Court reached this conclusion by
starting with the premise that Indian tribes submitted to United States sov-
ereignty when their lands were incorporated into the territory of the
United States. This premise is not only unsupported by precedent, but
undermines the principle of Indian sovereignty.
The Court relied principally on United States v. Rogers72 for its proposi-
tion that all Indian reservations are part of the United States' territory. In
Rogers, a non-Indian murdered another non-Indian in territory assigned
the Cherokee Nation by the United States under a removal treaty. Under
the force of certain removal treaties, one group of Cherokees relinquished
the right to its ancestral homelands in what is now the southeastern United
States in exchange for land of the United States west of the Mississippi
River.73
Finding that the federal court had jurisdiction over Rogers because he
was a non-Indian, 74 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Taney,
stated that the Cherokee Territory was part of the territory of the United
States, held by the Cherokees with the'assent and under the authority of
the United States.75 Justice Taney cited no rule of law or precedent in
support of this statement; therefore, the basis of his statement only be-
70. Id
71. 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
72. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
73. Treaty of December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478; Treaty of February 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 414;
Treaty of July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156; Treaty of February 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195; Treaty of May 6,
1828, 7 Stat. 311. See generally M. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION 100 (1938); 19 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 42, 43-44 (1887); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAW 53 n.343 (1971).
74. Rogers contended that the federal court had no jurisdiction to try him because he
had been adopted by the Cherokees and, under a federal statute, currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1976), federal jurisdiction did not extend to crimes committed by Indians.
The Court held that a non-Indian adopted by an Indian tribe does not thereby become an




comes clear in light of the unique acquisition of land by the Cherokee
Tribe. Unlike other tribes living on reservations in which title to an ab-
original land area was recognized by treaty, 76 the western territory of the
Cherokees had been created by a conveyance of United States land.
Therefore, Rogers is incorrectly cited for the proposition that all Indian
reservations are part of the territory of the United States. Indian lands
cannot acquire this status by simple unilateral declaration of the Supreme
Court.
The next step in the Court's analysis, that Indian tribes submitted to the
sovereignty of the United States when their lands became part of its terri-
tory, suffers from a similar infirmity. As authority, the Court cited the
following statement from Johnson v. M'Intosh: "[Tiheir rights of complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished. ' 77 This
statement, quoted only partially and out of context, was made by Chief
Justice John Marshall in a discussion of the limitations placed on Indian
tribes by the doctrine of discovery.78
Formulated to regulate the competing interests of European nations in
acquiring land in the New World, the doctrine of discovery, as outlined in
M'Intosh, gave the discovering nation a pre-emptive right to acquire title
to the discovered lands from Indian owners. 79 Based on Chief Justice
Marshall's use of the word "title" to describe the pre-emptive right ob-
tained by the discovering nation,80 the doctrine has been erroneously inter-
preted to mean that the United States, by succeeding to the rights of Great
Britain, acquired absolute fee simple title to all lands discovered in the
Americas."' A close reading of M'Intosh however, suggests that the doc-
trine did not purport to convey fee title to the discovering nation. Rather
76. See, e.g., Navajo Treaty, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959).
77. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), quoted in 435 U.S. at 209.
78. The full quotation reads as follows:
The [original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it. . .; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive
title to those who made it.
Id
79. Id at 573.
80. For example, Marshall says at one point: "The principle was, that discovery gave
title to the government by whose subjects . . .[discovery] was made . . . which title might
be consummated by possession." Id.
81. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285-91 (1955); Osce-
ola v. Kuykendall, No. 76-492 (D.D.C. March 11, 1977).
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than undermining the Indian nations' right to the lands they occupied, 82
the doctrine merely gave the discovering nation the right to purchase land
from the rightful owners, to the exclusion of all other European govern-
ments.83 Thus, MIntosh was not concerned with the complete submission
of the tribes to United States sovereignty and the acquisition of Indian
land by the United States as Oliphant suggests, but rather with the limita-
tion on the disposition of tribal land stemming from the doctrine of discov-
ery.
Implicit in the Court's decision is the notion that the United States ac-
quired sovereignty over Indian tribes through conquest.8 4 Such a theory,
however, lacks historical support. Rather than claiming power over Indian
land by virtue of conquest, the United States has uniformly followed a
policy of extinguishing the title of the Indian tribes only with their con-
sent.85 This policy has been expressed in a long course of treaty-making
during which tribes relinquished large tracts of land in return for guaran-
tees that their title to reserved areas would be respected. 86
Based on the premises that all Indian land is part of the United States'
territory and that the United States has sovereignty over all Indian tribes,
the Court concluded that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians by Indian tribes is inconsistent with their status as subjugated sov-
ereigns. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies solely on a separate
opinion by Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck.8 7 Characterizing Johnson's
opinion as a concurrence that summarized the "nature of the limitations
82. The Court stated: "[The original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful occu-
pants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it .... 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 574. Any misunderstanding about the meaning of the doctrine of discovery
should have been cleared up by Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 546 (1832), in
which Chief Justice Marshall stated: "these grants [in Royal Charters] asserted a title
against Europeans only, and were considered as blank pieces of paper so far as the rights of
the natives were concerned."
83. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
84. The Supreme Court has at least once stated incorrectly that the United States claims
ownership of and sovereignty over Indian lands under a theory of conquest. See Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
85. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS FOR 1890, at xxix; C.
THOMAS, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 640 (1897); W. WASHBURN, RED
MAN'S LAND-WHITE MAN'S LAW, 56-57 (1971); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L.
REV. 28 (1947).
86. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and the Delaware Tribe, August 18,
1804, 7 Stat. 81, in which the Delawares ceded a large area in exchange for United States
recognition of the Delawares "as the rightful owners of all the country" specifically reserved.
Id at Art. IV. See generally C. THOMAS, supra note 85.
87. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810)(Johnson, J., dissenting).
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inherently flowing from the overriding sovereignty of the United States, ' 88
the Court quoted the following passage from Fletcher: "[T]he restrictions
upon the right of soil in the Indians, amounts . . . to an exclusion of all
competitors [to the United States] from their markets; and the limitation
upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person
within their limits except themselves. ' 89 The limitations referred to by
Justice Johnson and cited by the O/iphant Court again concerned the effect
of the doctrine of discovery on Indian tribes rather than United States'
sovereignty over them, as claimed by the majority in O1phant. Signifi-
cantly, Justice Johnson's comments were made in dissent, not in concur-
rence,90 leaving the Court with a misinterpreted dissenting opinion as the
only authority for its conclusion.
In addition to the manipulation of precedent, the Court relied heavily
on what it termed legislative and judicial assumptions that Indian tribes
have no inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans. The Court justified this reliance by noting that treaties and statutes in
Indian law "cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of
the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted
them." 91 These assumptions were apparently viewed by the Court as ex-
pressions of general policy and attitudes illuminating the historical setting
of the case. Although historical perspective is helpful, the use of assump-
tions as an analytical device in Indian law is particularly problematic be-
cause the federal government has seldom spoken with a consistent and
uniform voice. Moreover, legislative materials are generally used to clarify
statutory ambiguities. Unlike the Court's use of assumptions in Oliphant,
the cases cited by the Court in support of its approach correctly used con-
gressional materials pertinent to statutes that controlled the case.92 The
88. 435 U.S. at 209.
89. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147, quoted in 435 U.S. at 209.
90. At issue in Fletcher was the validity of a conveyance by the Georgia legislature of
land to which Indian title had not been extinguished. Chief Justice Marshall, for the major-
ity, held that "the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts,
until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee
on the part of the state." 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43. In contrast, Justice Johnson would
have held that Georgia could not possibly have a fee simple interest in Indian lands because
the United States had acknowledged the tribes' "right of soil, by purchasing from them and
restraining all persons from encroaching upon their territory." Id at 147. The States' inter-
est in Indian lands was described by Justice Johnson as nothing more than a pre-emptive
right to extinguish Indian title when the tribes consented to sell, acquired under the doctrine
of discovery. Id
91. 435 U.S. at 206.
92. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1896)(interpretations of the
Montana Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889), used to determine whether the Act
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Court's assumptions also lack support in legislative materials and judicial
decisions.
Relying primarily on the Western Territory Bill,93 the 1854 amendments
to the Trade and Intercourse Act,94 and a 1960 Senate Report, 95 the Court
maintained that Congress has always assumed that Indian tribes were
without authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 96 The
Western Territory Bill, however, would have created a separate Indian ter-
ritory governed by a confederation of Indian tribes. The Court focused on
that part of the Bill applying United States law to United States officials,
travelers, and United States citizens required by treaty stipulation to reside
in the Indian territory.97 The Court ignored the fact that the primary ob-
jective of Congress was to create a territory in which an Indian govern-
ment would have jurisdiction over all permanent residents, including non-
Indians.98 The legislative materials accompanying the Bill reveal that
Congress, in fact, believed that Indian tribes could properly exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The House Committee that reported the
Bill explained its overall scheme as securing the right of self-government to
each tribe with jurisdiction over "all persons and property within its limits,
subject to certain exceptions, founded on principles somewhat analogous
to the international laws among civilized nations." 99 Even if the Court
correctly interpreted legislative intent, the Western Territory Bill is none-
theless an unreliable indicator of congressional policy because it was never
enacted.
Additionally, the Court looked to a provision in the 1854 amendments
to the Trade and Intercourse Act for support. The amendment prohibited
the prosecution in federal court of an Indian who had previously been
divested Montana of jurisdiction over offenses on the Crow Reservation not involving Indi-
ans).
93. H.R. 490, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. (1834). See notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra.
94. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 270 (current version in 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1976)). See notes 100- 102 and accompanying text infra.
95. S. Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1960).
96. 435 U.S. at 201-06.
97. 1d at 202.
98. Section nine clearly contemplated that the new Indian government would have ju-
risdiction over non-Indians:
... in all cases when a person not a member of any tribe shall be convicted of an
offense, the punishment whereof by the laws of the tribe shall be death, the judg-
ment shall be forewith reported to the Governor, who may for good reasons sus-
pend the execution thereof until the pleasure of the President shall be known.
H.R. 490, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1834).
99. H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1834).
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tried in a tribal court.l°0 The Court reasoned that the absence of a similar
provision barring retrial of non-Indians indicated a Congressional belief
that Indian tribes had no jurisdiction over non-Indians.' 0' To derive such
intent from this omission is far reaching in light of the purpose of the
amendment. Rather than devising a comprehensive scheme to meet a per-
vasive problem, Congress was reacting to an isolated incident in which an
Indian already tried in tribal court, was prosecuted again in federal
court. 10 2 Likewise, the Court's reliance on a 1960 Senate Report claiming
that tribal law is not enforcible against non-Indians is questionable. No
authority is cited in the Report as support for that proposition and the
Court gives no reason to justify regarding it as a correct statement of the
law.
A more recent and explicit expression of legislative policy suggests, in
contrast to O1phant, that Congress supports criminal jurisdiction of Indian
tribes over non-Indians. In enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,103 Congress specifically extended the Act's constitutional guarantees
to "any person, '' °4 rather than limiting its application solely to Indians.
An early version of the Act applicable only to Indians was later changed to
include all persons. The purpose of this change, as expressed by the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, was to extend the guarantees
of the Act to "all persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal
governments, whether Indians or non-Indians."'' 0 5 The majority in Oli-
phant dismisses this change as an expression of Congress' desire to extend
the Act to non-Indians "if and where they come under a tribe's criminal or
civil jurisdiction by either treaty provision or act of Congress."'6 No evi-
dence from the legislative history of the Act is offered to support this high-
ly speculative reading of congressional intent. Moreover, it is most
unlikely that Congress would define the scope of the Act's coverage in
terms of the occurrence of some uncertain future event.
The Court's finding of a judicial assumption against tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians is as unreliable as its strained interpretation of legislative
100. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 270 (current version in 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1976)).
101. 435 U.S. at 203.
102. 23 Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 701 (1854).
103. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1341 (1976).
104. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (3), (4), (6), (8) & (10) in note 50 supra.
105. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SUM-
MARY REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (Comm. Print 1966).
106. 435 U.S. at 195-96 n.6.
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materials. In Exparte Kenyon, 10 7 the only authority cited by the Court to
support its conclusion, a non-Indian was convicted of larceny in a Chero-
kee tribal court. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas found that the tribal court did not have subject matter juris-
diction because the offense was committed beyond the boundaries of the
Cherokee territory. Although the issue of whether an Indian tribe may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for acts committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Indian court was not before the court,
Judge Parker stated that an Indian court may assume criminal jurisdiction
only when the offender is an Indian. 0 8 By reading Kenyon to hold that
Indian courts have jurisdiction in criminal cases only if the offender is an
Indian, the O1phant Court elevates the dictum in Kenyon to the rule of the
case.
In addition to relying on unsupported assumptions, the Court misap-
plied the rules of construction to the provisions of the Point Elliot Treaty
of 1855, which governs the legal relationship between the Suquamish
Tribe and the United States.'0 9 Article IX of the treaty acknowledges that
the Suquamish Tribe is dependent upon the United States for protection
from non-Indian intruders into their territory." 10 The Court concluded
that by this treaty provision, the Suquamish recognized that the federal
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indians. I"' In reaching
this conclusion, the Court refused to apply the longstanding rule that am-
biguous provisions in treaties must be resolved as the Indians would have
understood them." 12 Dismissing evidence that the Suquamish would not
have equated acceptance of United States' protection with relinquishing
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 113 the Court purported to apply a dif-
107. 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878).
108. Id The Oliphant Court attempts to lend credence to Judge Parker's comments by
noting that his conclusion was reaffirmed in a 1970 Opinion of the Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of the Interior. 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970). By the Court's own admission, however,
that Opinion has since been withdrawn, rendering its validity questionable. Moreover, a
1934 Solicitor's Opinion reached the opposite conclusion. See 55 Interior Dec. 14, 57
(I 934)(an Indian tribe "might punish aliens within its jurisdiction according to its own laws
and customs").
109. 12 Stat. 927 (1955).
110. 12 Stat. at 929.
III. 435 U.S. at 207. The Court's conclusion contradicts the principle of international
law, applied to the relations between Indian nations and the United States in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-6 1, that a nation accepting the protection of another na-
tion surrenders no attributes of its sovereignty.
112. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Jones v. Meehan, 175
U.S. I, 10-11 (1899).
113. A draft treaty considered by the parties at the negotiations contained a provision
specifically recognizing United States jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Brief for Respon-
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ferent rule: surrounding circumstances may be relied on to clarify treaty
and statutory provisions. 1 4 Yet, in the final analysis, the Court failed to
apply its own rule of construction because it showed no circumstances sur-
rounding the signing of the treaty to support its conclusion.," 
5
The second provision cited by the Court involved an agreement by the
Suquamish to deliver to the United States non-Indians violating United
States law and seeking refuge within the Suquamish Territory. 1 6 From
this provision the Court drew the inference that the Suquamish agreed not
to try and punish non-Indians."17 Such an inference is clearly inappropri-
ate because Oliphant involved criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
violate tribal law rather than United States law. An agreement to turn
over non-Indians violating United States law is not inconsistent with the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the tribe over non-Indians violating
tribal law because two different legal systems are involved. In addition to
making no effort to ascertain the Suquamish's understanding of this provi-
sion as required by rules of treaty interpretation, the Court ignored the
rather obvious interpretation that this provision is a simple extradition
clause inserted to conform the relations between the United States and the
Suquamish to the usual international practice." 18
The Oiphant opinion is also suspect because it largely ignores a well-
established body of case law recognizing the inherent and residual sover-
eignty of Indian tribes. The Court departed from the principle of residual
sovereignty by ruling that Indian tribes have no inherent authority to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because such authority is in-
consistent with their status as subjugated sovereigns. In holding that tribal
dents, app. at A-20, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). This provi-
sion was omitted from the final version, but no explanation of the reasons was recorded in
the minutes of the treaty negotiations. Although there is no specific evidence on this point,
the logical inference is that the Suquamish intended jurisdiction over non-Indians to remain
in the tribe. The Court dismissed the draft treaty as irrelevant, claiming that itoseems prob-
able that the [Treaty] Commission preferred to use the language that had been recom-
mended by the Office of Indian Affairs." 435 U.S. at 206-07 n.16.
114. 435 U.S. at 208 n.17. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444
(1975).
115. The Court's interpretation appears to be based on its own speculation. For exam-
ple, the Court says that by acknowledging their dependence on the United States, the Su-
quamish were "in all probability" recognizing that jurisdiction over non-Indians would be
exclusively in the United States. 435 U.S. at 207.
116. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, Art. IX, 12 Stat. 927, 929 (1855).
117. 435 U.S. at 208. The Court reads this provision in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (1976) which extends federal enclave law to non-Indian offenses on Indian reserva-
tions.
118. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has so construed a similar provision.
Arizona ex. rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1969).
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
powers may be limited by this judicially determined status, the Court di-
rectly contradicts the longstanding rule that tribal powers could be limited
only by treaty stipulation or congressional enactment. 19 The Court fur-
ther departed from the principle of residual sovereignty by deciding the
issue of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for all Indian tribes, despite
the fact that the narrow issue before the Court was the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the Suquamish Tribe over non-Indians. When the authority of an
individual Indian tribe is at issue, the doctrine of residual sovereignty re-
quires the status of that tribe to be determined separately, since particular
treaties and statutes directly affect only certain tribes.' 20 Rather than fo-
cusing exclusively on the treaties and statutes that directly affect the pow-
ers of the Suquamish Tribe, the Court in Oliphant relied heavily on
treaties with other tribes and broad statements of congressional and execu-
tive policy.' 2 By encompassing all Indian tribes in its decision, the Court
failed to recognize the individualized nature of tribal powers and at-
tempted to decide the issue for tribes who had no opportunity to present
their case. 22
Thus, a close examination of the Court's analytical framework suggests
that Oliphant is a result-oriented decision. Had the Court looked to policy
considerations, it may have found some basis to support its decision. It is,
therefore, surprising that the policy considerations guiding the Court were
not more fully articulated. The Court merely implies that it would be un-
fair to subject non-Indians to an Indian system of justice that is based on
119. As authority for this departure from prior law the Court merely adopted a statement
by the Ninth Circuit in the same case that Indian tribes "retain those powers of autonomous
states that are neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated by Congress."
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court's reliance on the Ninth
Circuit's formulation of the residual sovereignty principle is misplaced for two reasons.
First, the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit as authority furnish no support for the proposition
that Indian tribes may not exercise any power inconsistent with their status. See Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), notes 22-31 supra. Second, the Ninth Circuit did not apply its own formulation of
the rule. Rather than analyzing the status of Indian tribes to determine whether the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with that status, it applied the tradi-
tional analysis of searching treaties and statutes for limitations on tribal powers and con-
cluded that no treaty or statute limited the power of the Suquamish tribe to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 544 F.2d at 1010-12.
120. Compare Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 333 (1830) (the
tribe's jurisdiction is limited to "the Choctaw Nation of red people and their descendants ")
with the Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 14 (1788) (provides some
measure of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
121. For example, the Court cites a Choctaw treaty, see note 120 supra, to support its
conclusion that treaties evidence a presumption that Indian tribes had no inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 435 U.S. at 197.
122. 435 U.S. at 211.
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different customs and standards. Although a few tribal codes seek to in-
corporate distinctly Indian concepts of justice, most are patterned after
Anglo-American legal codes, 123 making the structures and procedures of
Indian courts similar in many respects to non-Indian courts. 124 Despite
the growing similarity between Indian and non-Indian courts, however,
significant differences remain. It can only be assumed that the Court in its
brief statement was referring to these differences. For example, it is true
that constitutional procedural protections available to defendants in In-
dian courts may be more limited than those available in state and federal
courts.' 25 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act guarantees certain protec-
tions for non-Indian as well as Indian defendants, 126 it does not provide all
the protections contained in the Bill of Rights. One major difference is
that the Act does not guarantee the assistance of counsel in criminal cases;
rather, it allows defendants to obtain counsel at their own expense.
27
Moreover, it is not clear whether Congress intended to apply to tribal gov-
ernments the same substantive standards that the federal courts have de-
veloped in applying the Bill of Rights to state and federal governments. 1
28
Although the procedural protections may not be identical, the Indian
Civil Rights Act significantly reduced the danger that fundamental rights
of non-Indians would be violated by Indian governments. Because Con-
gress believed that Indian governments had jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans, 129 the Act should be understood as a congressional measure to ensure
that the civil rights of non-Indians are not violated by tribal governments.
The fact that the Act fails to detail an exhaustive list of procedural protec-
tions for defendants in Indian courts does not reduce its effectiveness;
rather, it suggests that the development of specific protections should be
left to the tribal courts. It cannot plausibly be argued that because the
process is not complete Indian governments should be denied absolutely
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Another possible objection to Indian criminal jurisdiction over non-In-
dians is that non-Indians are ineligible to participate in tribal government
123. See generally S. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS 17 (1978).
124. The Court in Olihant expressly recognized this fact. 435 U.S. at 211-12.
125. See generally de Raismis, The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of
Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S. DAK. L. REV. 59 (1975).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976). See note 50 supra.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1976).
128. See generally Note, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law.- The Right to Civil Counsel
and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. SURVEY HUMAN RIGHTS L. 49 (1971); Note,
The Indian Bill ofRights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1343 (1969).
129. See notes 50, 104-05 supra and accompanying text.
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on many reservations. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly re-
jected the argument that the exercise of tribal authority over non-Indians
is inappropriate due to nonparticipation in tribal government.' 30 In so
holding, the Court implicitly recognized that the tribe's interest in sover-
eignty outweighs the interest of non-Indians in being free from the juris-
diction of a government in which they may not participate. Finally, it has
been argued that because the quality of the administration of justice varies
greatly from reservation to reservation the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians is inequitable.13' This is not a valid objection because
the right to exercise sovereign authority does not depend on how well it is
exercised. Furthermore, tribal courts have improved their quality and ef-
fectiveness through training programs such as one provided by the Na-
tional American Indian Court Judges Association, 132 and many tribes are
currently revising their constitutions and law and order codes. 133
To be evaluated properly, these potential objections to criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians must be weighed against the strong policy consider-
ations favoring tribal jurisdiction. Primary among these is the fact that the
tribal government frequently is the only authority capable of governing the
reservation. Oiphant dealt a blow, in a practical and legal sense, to the
efforts of Indian tribes to govern effectively the people living within the
reservation boundaries. Indian tribes now face the prospect of dealing
with large non-Indian populations immune from tribal criminal laws. In
denying the tribes criminal jurisdiction, the Court has enhanced the politi-
cal and economic power of non-Indians living and working on reserva-
tions and thereby has diminished the status of Indian tribes as the
legitimate governing authority on the reservation.
Moreover, frequently the tribal court is the only forum available in
which to prosecute non-Indians for minor offenses.134 Federal and county
prosecutors are often reluctant to institute proceedings for minor offenses
due to crowded dockets and the confusing jurisdictional division between
federal, tribal, and state governments. A Justice Department Task Force
found that because minor Indian cases are ill-suited to the federal court
system, federal prosecution is slow and uncertain. 135 Thus, the exercise of
130. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975).
131. See generally S. BRAKEL, supra note 123. But see Collins, Johnson, Perkins, Ameri-
can Indian Courts and Tribal Self-Government, 63 A.B.A. J. 808 (1977).
132. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 165.
133. Id
134. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
135. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN MATTERS 41
(1975)(cited in Chairmen's Ass'n Brief, supra note I, at 37). The Report found that United
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criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by Indian tribes is essential to the
preservation of law and order on the reservation. The O/{phant decision
strikes a serious blow to this necessary judicial authority.
III. CONCLUSION
American courts have consistently recognized the inherent and residual
sovereignty of Indian tribes over their people and territory. In Oiphant,
the Court largely ignored this well-established body of case law and un-
dermined traditional principles of judicial decisionmaking. The Court's
conclusion, that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by
Indian tribes is inconsistent with their subjugated status, propounds ques-
tionable legal premises supported only by the weakest of precedent. Simi-
larly, the Court ignored legislative materials inconsistent with its conclu-
sion that Congress believed Indian tribes had no authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and failed to apply well-established
rules of treaty interpretation.
Despite the adverse impact of the Court's decision on Indian govern-
ments, Indian tribes retain many important attributes of sovereignty. Oi-
phant does not preclude the exercise of sovereign power by Indian tribes
over their own members and the exercise of civil jurisdiction over reserva-
tion territory. Indian tribes will continue to retain all sovereign powers not
relinquished by treaty, taken away by Congress or found by courts to be
inconsistent with their status. Nevertheless, the Court's holding that tribal
powers may be lost by implication places a severe legal restriction on In-
dian sovereignty and raises the possibility of further judicial erosion of
Indian rights. Thus, Oiphant must ultimately retard the efforts of Indian
tribes to achieve greater governmental autonomy and to govern the reser-
vation effectively.
Curtis 6. Berkey
States Attorneys declined to prosecute 75% of the Indian cases presented to them for the
period studied. Id
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LABOR LAW - Full-time Faculty Members of a Private
University are Managerial Employees Excluded from
Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB
v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
The provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,' (NLRA or Act),
reflect a policy that units of employees, 2 through chosen representatives,
should be able to deal with employers on an equal footing in determining
the terms and conditions of their employment.3 In line with this policy,
supervisory and managerial employees, typically aligned with the em-
ployer in the industrial setting, are excluded from the Act's coverage.4
Professional employees, however, are expressly covered by the Act unless
their duties fall within the supervisory or managerial exclusions.5 Recent
assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) over private colleges and universities, accompanied by an increase
in faculty organizing,6 has required the Board to determine whether uni-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 166 (1976). With the passage of the NLRA in 1935, Congress,
in its first attempt to regulate labor relations, gave the National Labor Relations Board
broad authority to regulate employer-employee relations.
2. Section 9(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), gives the Board responsibility for
determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit. The Board need only determine an
appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit. See, e.g., Wil-Kil Pest Control Co. v.
NLRB, 440 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1971). Unit determinations have been likened to the drawing
of legislative election districts in that the composition of the unit ultimately determines the
success of the union's attempt to gain bargaining representation status. See Comment, The
Appropriate Faculty Bargaining Unit in Private Colleges and Universities, 59 VA. L. REV. 492,
494 (1973). See note 23 infra.
3. Beaird & Covington, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education. The Immediate
Prospects, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (1972). See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
4. In 1947 Congress amended Section 2(3) of the NLRA to exclude supervisors from
the definition of "employee" and thus from the Act's coverage. Taft-Hartley Act Amend-
ments of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 138 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)).
See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra. Although the Act, as amended, does not
contain a specific exclusion for managerial employees, an exclusion was developed over the
years through case law. Menard, Exploding Representation Areas." Colleges and Universities,
17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 931, 954 (1976); see notes 29-31 and accompanying text
infra.
5. Congress also added section 2(12) to the NLRA in 1947, thereby including profes-
sional employees engaged predominantly in intellectual work. Taft-Hartley Act Amend-
ments of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(12), 61 Stat. 138 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)
(1976)). See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
6. The Board assumed jurisdiction over private colleges and universities in Cornell
Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Substantial faculty organization had occurred prior to the
Cornell ruling, but without federally protected labor rights, representatives had little power
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versity faculty should be classified as professional employees within the
Act's coverage or as supervisory/managerial employees, excluded from
statutory protections. Due to the unique role of faculty in university gov-
ernance,7 the application of industrial precedent has been difficult, and has
led to inconsistent results.8 Nevertheless, the Board has consistently main-
tained the position that full-time faculty are neither supervisors nor man-
agers under the Act, but are instead professional employees, functioning in
the collegial system. 9 Recently, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the Board's position and held
that full-time faculty are managerial employees and thus excluded from
the Act's protection.10
In 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association filed a representa-
tion election petition seeking certification" as the exclusive bargaining
representative for a unit essentially composed of the full-time faculty.12 In
to force universities to bargain collectively. Comment, supra note 2, at 492 n.6 (1973). As of
1968, only one of 1400 private colleges had adopted a collective bargaining agreement. See
Ferguson, Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L.J. 778, 803 (1968).
Labor organizations currently administer faculty collective bargaining agreements at over
500 college campuses. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 697 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
7. In contrast to a typical industrial setting, the system of governance recognized in
American higher education gives the faculty a significant role in recommendations on
faculty appointments, promotion, tenure, and dismissal, as well as in matters of educational
policy. See Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
805, 817 (1977). Compare Kirp, Collective Bargaining in Education.- Professionals as a Politi-
cal Interest Group, 21 J. PuB. L. 323, 327 n.20 (1972) ("[Faculty members have a role...
that reaches far beyond even the wildest dream of the most radical unions") with Blackburn,
Should Faculty Organize? in FACULTY POWER: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 117,
123 (T. Tice ed. 1972) ("[F]aculty power is a myth. The notion is a smoke screen covering
where the real power resides-in boards and administrations.").
8. See, e.g., New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 6 (1973). Both the Board's entry into
and subsequent handling of university cases has engendered a great deal of criticism. Com-
pare Kahn, The NLRB. & Higher Education.- The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudi-
cation, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63 (1973) with Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 45 U.
TOL. L. REV. 608 (1974). See also Menard, supra note 4, at 932. ("[N]o other single
representation field has spawned as much controversy in so short a time, and has left as
many unanswered questions.").
9. See Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B.
247 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4
(1973); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134
(1971); C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
10. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 688.
11. When a petition has been filed, section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1),
requires the Board to conduct an investigation to provide for a hearing and, upon a finding
that a question concerning representation exists, to direct an election.
12. 582 F.2d at 688. The University is composed of 12 schools and colleges and has
approximately 209 full-time and 150 part-time faculty members.
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opposing the petition, Yeshiva University contended that its faculty mem-
bers were supervisory or managerial personnel as a result of their partici-
pation in collegial decisionmaking. 13 Relying on its rationale in past
decisions, the Board rejected the supervisory/managerial argument and
found the Yeshiva faculty to be professional employees entitled to the
Act's coverage. 14 Consequently, following an election the Board certified a
bargaining unit composed of the full-time faculty.' 5
The university, however, refused to bargain with the newly certified
union, thereby committing an unfair labor practice in violation of the
Act 16 and forcing the Board to apply to the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit to enforce its bargaining order.' 7 As an affirmative defense,
the university restated its supervisory/managerial exclusion argument
raised unsuccessfully in the representation proceeding. 18 The Second Cir-
cuit, in the first court decision to determine the issue squarely, 19 agreed
13. See Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 (1975), enforcement denied, NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
14. In rejecting the supervisory/managerial argument, the Board takes the position that
faculty members are professional employees under the Act; that their participation in colle-
gial decisionmaking is on a collective rather than an individual basis; that their authority is
exercised in the faculty's interest, rather than in the interest of the employer; and, that final
authority rests with the university board of trustees. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
15. Alternatively, the university sought a unit consisting of all full-time and regular
part-time faculty, excluding as supervisory and or managerial personnel: department
chairpersons, members of the university's Committee on Academic Priorities and Resource
Allocation, members of the Faculty Review Committee, assistant deans, principal investiga-
tors of research and training grants, and faculty to be terminated as of the date of the elec-
tion. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054. The union wanted to include all but the part-time faculty in the
bargaining unit. The Board substantially agreed, and excluded as supervisors only the prin-
cipal investigators from the unit of full-time faculty. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at
689 n.2.
16. Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1976), makes it unlawful for an
employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed by the Act. Under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1976), it is un-
lawful for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with employee representatives
selected by a majority of an appropriate bargaining unit.
17. See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
18. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 689. A representation proceeding, e.g., a unit
determination, cannot be judicially reviewed because it does not constitute a final order
under the Act. Consequently, a unit determination is not reviewable until an employer re-
fuses to bargain with a union which has won an election. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 59-60 (1976).
19. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has twice addressed related issues of
faculty status. In NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975), the Institute ar-
gued that all faculty at all institutions of higher learning were excluded from the Act. The
court rejected this far-reaching argument and found that neither the Institute's faculty nor its
committee exercised substantial management or supervisory authority, either individually or
collectively. In Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir.) petiion for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. July 11, 1978)(No. 78-67), the university argued that particular
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with the university and denied enforcement of the Board's order. Judge
Mulligan, writing for the unanimous three-judge panel, reasoned that
faculty members who are responsible for determining the central policies
of the institution merited managerial status under the Act.20 Acknowledg-
ing that Board unit determinations were generally accorded great weight,
the court nevertheless invalidated the Board's finding, barring the faculty
from the Act's protection.2l In rejecting the Board's inclusion of university
faculty under the Act, the Second Circuit was critical particularly of the
Board's lack of explanation for its position.22 Although an examination of
the Board's decisions suggests that this criticism has merit, close scrutiny of
Yeshiva indicates that the court similarly failed to base its position on the
policies of the Act or the realities of the role of faculty in today's universi-
ties.
I. THE NLRB ARRIVES ON CAMPUS
Initially, in determining the size, scope and composition of bargaining
units, 23 the NLRB excluded as supervisors or managers those individuals
who lacked a community of interest with units of rank and file employ-
chairpersons and not the entire faculty were supervisors. The court rejected this argument,
finding that the chairpersons' recommendations were not effective nor made in the interest
of the employer.
20. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 585 F.2d at 698. Judge Mulligan was formerly dean of the
law school at Fordham University where the university raised the supervisory/managerial
argument in a similar faculty representation proceeding. See Nielsen, Yeshiva.- An Outra-
geous Decision, THE AMERICAN TEACHER, Sept. 1978, at 4.
21. 582 F.2d at 702-03. A Board determination that an individual is an employee under
the Act will stand if it has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in the statute. NLRB
v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); cf. NLRB v. Mercy College, 536 F.2d
544, 550 (2d Cir. 1976)(Board's unit determination receives more than the usual weight).
But see Niagara Univ. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d. Cir. 1977) (closer scrutiny will
result when the Board has acted inconsistently with prior rulings).
22. See 582 F.2d at 698 n.14 (Board's position is without analysis or citation to pertinent
administrative decisions, judicial precedents, or legislative history).
23. The Act provides no guidance as to unit determinations. Therefore, the Board relies
on past rulings and looks at the circumstances of each case in light of Board policy. See
Note, Collective Bargaining by University and College Faculties Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 77 (1975). Generally, employees who share a "commu-
nity of interest" with respect to the terms and conditions of employment will comprise an
employee unit. The Board considers the following factors: (I) the history of collective bar-
gaining; (2) the extent of union organization; (3) the degree of functional integration of the
production process; (4) the skills and duties of the employees; (5) common supervision; and
(6) interchangeability and other contact among employees. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 82 (1977). When there is a question of
professional status or craft cohesion, the employees' wishes are considered. Moore, The De-
termination of Bargaining Unitsfor College Faculties, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 43, 46 (1976).
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ees. 24 This policy did not foreclose coverage by the Act because the Board
permitted some of these employees to form a separate bargaining unit.25
Prompted by dissatisfaction with a Board decision permitting foremen to
form a separate bargaining unit, Congress excluded supervisors from the
Act's coverage through the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. 26 The amend-
ments broadly define supervisors as "individuals" who possess authority to
recommend or implement, "in the employer's interest," measures to con-
trol or direct other employees.27 The purpose of the exclusion was two-
fold: to prevent loss of employer control through subjecting supervisors to
union influence, and to protect the union from possible domination by
agents of the employer.2 8 Even though the statutory amendments did not
exclude managerial personnel, the Board continued to exclude managers
who "formulate, determine and effectuate an employer's policies" 29 from
the rank and file unit, but allowed some managerial personnel to form
their own unit.30 Nevertheless, to conform with the statutory exclusion of
supervisors, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of
24. Prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, the only employee classifications spe-
cifically excluded by the statute were agricultural workers, domestic servants, and members
of the employer's immediate family. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat.
450 (1935)(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)). See Comment, Will the RealMana-
gerial Employees Please Stand Up, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 92, 93 (1975).
25. See Comment, supra note 24, at 97.
26. Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), amended by Taft-Hartley to
exclude supervisors from the Act, overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Packard Mo-
tor Car Corp. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
27. Section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), defines a "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action if ... the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment (emphasis
added).
The requirements have been read disjunctively, so that possession of any one of the criteria
will result in supervisory status. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d
1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. See Moore, supra note 23, at 49.
29. See Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963); Ford Motor Co.,
66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). The precision of the statute's definition of supervisor has not
been equaled in either judicial or Board verbal formulations of managerial status; this may
explain why the Board has tended to blur the distinction between the two. See Finkin, supra
note 8, at 614.
30. At one point the Board specifically held that managers were not entitled to any of
the protections of the Act. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956)(Board refused to create a
separate unit for managerial employees). The Board later reversed itself, finding that mana-
gerial employees were entitled to bargaining rights unless they shaped or implemented labor
relations policies for their employer. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 551
(1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). For an excellent discussion of the
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Textron, Inc. recently held that all managerial employees were excluded
from the Act's protection. 3'
At the same time Congress excluded supervisors from the Act's cover-
age, it specifically included professional employees. 32 Since work which is
based on professional competence necessarily involves consistent exercise
of discretion and judgment, the professional employee inclusion and the
supervisory exclusion overlap. Congress, however, did not distinguish be-
tween the two groups, and Bell Aerospace likewise failed to instruct the
Board and the courts in distinguishing between managerial and profes-
sional employees. 33 Consequently, the Board faced the responsibility of
resolving the tension between these overlapping provisions in its bargain-
ing unit determinations.
The inherent difficulty in reconciling these conflicting employee classifi-
cations is enhanced in the context of the university setting. Because educa-
tional policymaking is diffuse and often vested in groups, it is difficult for
the Board to determine exactly who is making supervisory or managerial
decisions within the meaning of the Act.34 Thus, when the Board departed
from two decades of tradition to assert jurisdiction over private colleges
and universities in Cornell University,35 it invited consideration of faculty
confused status of managerial personnel, see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron,
Inc., 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
31. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). In Bell Aerospace, the Board certified a unit comprised of
buyers in Bell's purchasing and procurement department, rejecting the employer's conten-
tion that they were managerial employees. A divided Supreme Court held that Congress
implicitly excluded all managerial employees from the Act and that the Board was "not now
free" to limit the exclusion to those employees whose union activity might present a conflict
of interest. 1d. at 289. The decision has been heavily criticized for its strained construction
of the consequences that would attend unionization of managerial employees. See Barney,
Bell Aerospace and the Status of Managerial Employees Under the NLA, I IND. REL. L.J.
346 (1976).
32. Section 2(12) of the NLRA defines professional employees as:
any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in charac-
ter. . .(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. . .(iii) of
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning. ...
The Board's cases indicate that it reads these requirements conjunctively, usually demand-
ing the presence of one or more of the four criteria. See Comment, supra note 2, at 497.
Compare § 2(12) with § 2(11) supra note 27.
33. See Comment, supra note 24, at 113-14. See also Brief for the National Labor
Relations Board at 19 n.10, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NLRB Brief].
34. See Comment, supra note 2, at 499-500.
35. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). The decision that colleges and universities fell outside the
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status under the Act. Nonetheless, since Cornell involved bargaining units
of primarily blue-collar and clerical workers, neither the parties 36 nor the
Board made reference to its implications for university faculty. 37 As a re-
sult, the status of organizational rights of university faculty remained an
open question after Cornell.38
One year later, the Board addressed this question in C. W Post Center of
Long Island University.39 In 1970, the United Federation of College
Board's jurisdiction was initially made in Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427
(195 l)(Board jurisdiction not asserted over educational institutions when activities noncom-
mercial and intimately connected with charitable and educational activities). See NLRA
§ 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976)(Board may decline jurisdiction where the effect of a
labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant exercise of its jurisdic-
tion). In 1970, however, the Board was troubled by the workability of this distinction since
universities' operations had spiraled and were almost always commercial in character. 183
N.L.R.B. at 332. Additionally, the Board, influenced by the failure of states to enact labor
relations legislation and increased federal involvement in higher education, reasoned that
educational employees should be afforded the same protection as employees in the profit-
making sector. See Note, supra note 23, at 74.
36. Interestingly, it was the university administration who urged the Board to assert
jurisdiction in Cornell. This oddity is explained by the fact that a petition had been filed
against the university with the state labor relations board. Since state law appeared to favor
unions and the NLRA more evenly balanced employer-employee interests, the university
sought jurisdiction under the federal Act. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 94. Cornell Univer-
sity's position was extremely unpopular with universities in states with no state act or labor
relations board. Ferguson, Private Institutions andthe NLRB in FACULTY POWER: COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 59, 60 (T. Tice ed. 1972).
37. Since jurisdiction was the major issue in the case, the Board's decision was primarily
devoted to changing economic and sociological factors mandating assertion of jurisdiction.
See Kahn, supra note 8, at 91 n.102. See note 35 supra.
38. In determining the appropriate nonfaculty bargaining unit, the Board indicated, in
dicta, that it considered its industrial-oriented determination principles as reliable in the
educational context as in the industrial. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 336 (1970). Subse-
quently, the Board denied a petition filed by the American Association of University Profes-
sors requesting the Board to establish general rules for faculty collective bargaining. The
Board feared that adoption of inflexible rules for units of teaching employees would prevent
the Board from adapting its approach to a highly pluralistic set of conditions. See Note,
supra note 23, at 78-79. The Board rarely proceeds by rulemaking and has been heavily
criticized for not doing so in the faculty cases. See Menard & DiGiovanni, NLRB Jurisdic-
tion Over Colleges and Universities.- A Plea for Rulemaking, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 599
(1975); Kahn, supra note 8.
Also left unanswered by Cornell was the appropriate dollars-volume amount necessary to
invoke Board jurisdiction. Six months later, pursuant to a rulemaking procedure, the Board
announced it would assume jurisdiction over any private, nonprofit university with a gross
annual income of at least $1 million. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977). The Board estimated that
this standard would bring 80% of all private colleges and universities and 95% of all nonpro-
fessional personnel within the reach of the Act. 35 Fed. Reg. 18371 (1970).
39. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). See also Long Island Univ. (Brooklyn Center), 189
N.L.R.B. 909 (1971), a companion case. These initial faculty determinations are given ex-
tensive treatment in Kahn, supra note 8, at 95-102.
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Teachers filed representation petitions seeking elections among the faculty
at C.W. Post. Under university regulations, the full-time faculty had the
power and responsibility to formulate and recommend student admissions
and curriculum criteria as well as faculty matters such as promotion, ten-
ure, and dismissal. ° Its recommendations on these matters were review-
able by university officials and finalized by the board of trustees. The
university first argued that the Board's jurisdiction, if asserted over univer-
sities, should not include professional personnel. The Board rejected this
argument, reasoning that the individuals involved "have the usual inci-
dents of the employer-employee relationship. ' '4 1 In the alternative, the
university asserted that the unique status of faculty personnel required the
application of principles different from those applied in unit determina-
tions in industry. Finding that no practice of collective bargaining in the
academic field mandated a modification of ordinary unit determination
principles, the Board also rejected this contention and proceeded to con-
sider the issue of unit determination. 42
In addressing this issue, the university argued only that the deans and
department chairpersons should be barred from the unit under the super-
visory exclusion. While agreeing that these faculty members exercised suf-
ficient authority in hiring and personnel matters to qualify as supervisors,
the Board also set forth its views on the supervisory status of faculty mem-
bers in general under the Act.4 3 Acknowledging that it was entering into
an uncharted area, the Board stated that the "policymaking and quasi-
supervisory authority which adheres to full-time faculty status but is exer-
cised by them only as a group does not make them supervisors within...
40. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
41. Id. at 904. The consensus of opinion is that such an argument requiring a distinc-
tion between categories of professional employees is legally impermissible. In assuming ju-
risdiction over university employees in Cornell, the Board was required to assume
jurisdiction over professional employees of higher education since section 14(c)(1) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976), speaks of jurisdiction over classes of employers and
does not differentiate among types of employees. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 85 n.79, 91.
This argument was later made in Fordham Univ., 198 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), and summarily
dismissed by the Board.
42. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971). The Board reached this conclusion
by examining faculty cases decided by state labor relations boards which had been cited by
the university. 1d. at 905 n.7. See NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976)(Board does not
have jurisdiction over political subdivisions of states).
43. The issue of whether all faculty were supervisory/managerial was raised at least
tangentially. Finkin, supra note 8, at 612. Professor Finkin contends that the Board reached
beyond the specific arguments put forth by the university and that its conclusion must be
considered dictum. Id. at 613. But see Kahn, supra note 8, at 121: "Despite the holding in
C. W Post... "(emphasis added).
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the Act, or managerial employees.""4 Finding that full-time faculty mem-
bers "qualiffied] in every respect" as professional employees, the Board
determined the appropriate faculty unit to include full-time and part-time
faculty,45 but to exclude department chairpersons as supervisors. 46 As the
first Board decision on the issue, C W Post set the precedent that faculty
as professional employees fall within the statutory umbrella and that their
possession of quasi-supervisory authority on a collective basis is not
grounds for their exclusion within the supervisory/managerial exclusions.
Nevertheless, university administrations in subsequent representation
proceedings vigorously argued that entire faculties were composed of man-
agerial or supervisory employees and thus devoid of collective bargaining
rights.47 In Fordham University, for example, the university attempted to
support this contention by compiling a detailed record showing faculty
members' authority in hiring, promoting, adjusting grievances, and other
44. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905 (emphasis added). See note 27 supra.
45. The Board's handling of part-time faculty has provided critics with a prime illustra-
tion of how its industry rules fail in a university setting. For 40 years, the Board has main-
tained a policy in the industrial sector of including part-time and full-time employees in the
same unit. See Menard, supra note 4, at 938. Consequently, the Board included part-time
faculty in the unit in C. W Post and succeeding cases. See, e.g., University of New Haven,
Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 478 (197 1). Due to problems encountered by the Board surrounding the
part-time faculties at Catholic, Fairleigh Dickinson and New York Universities, the Board
sought additional information through the rare procedure of consolidated oral argument.
See Kahn, supra note 8, at 110. Ultimately, the Board reversed itself in New York Univ.,
205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973), finding differences in compensation, participation in university gov-
ernance, tenure eligibility and working conditions too substantial to include part-time and
full-time faculty in the same unit.
46. The status of department chairpersons is probably the most unique unit determina-
tion problem. Note, supra note 23, at 80. The Board included chairpersons in the faculty
unit at Fordham, NYU, Detroit, Miami, and Northwestern. Chairpersons were excluded,
however, at C.W. Post, Adelphi, Syracuse, Fairleigh Dickenson, and Point Park College.
According to two commentators' analyses of these decisions, if the chairpersons are no more
than first among equals, selected by colleagues to represent the faculty interests in negotia-
tions with the administration, they are included in the unit. If they are appointed by the
administration to supervise the department as the administration sees fit, then they are ex-
cluded. If they are neither, the Board balances their interests to determine whether they are
closer to the university or the faculty. Pollitt & Thompson, Collective Bargaining on the
Campus: A Survey Five Years After Cornell, I INDUs. REL. L.J. 191, 231 (1976).
47. Finkin, supra note 8, at 613 (citing New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Man-
hattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971)). Manhat-
tan College spent over 60 pages in its brief arguing that its faculty should be excluded
because faculty members individually exercised supervisory authority and/or constituted
the management of the college. G. Bodner, The No Agent Vote at NYU: A Concise Legal
History, at II (Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service Special Report No. 9,
Aug. 1974) (available from ACBIS, 1818 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009). Mr.
Bodner is presently Labor Counsel for Yeshiva University.
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areas of academic life.48 Although admitting their important and some-
times determinative role in academic matters, the faculty union argued
that these were not areas of managerial or supervisory authority, but rather
matters within the ambit of a professional group's expertise.49 Stressing
that the faculty exercised its role in policy determination only as a group,
the Board relied upon C. W Post and rejected the university's supervisory
argument. Alternatively, the university argued that all department
chairpersons and faculty members on the policymaking committees were
supervisors. Because committee members were elected by faculty to repre-
sent it as a whole, the Board again reasoned that faculty members were not
"individual" supervisors within the meaning of the statute, since "no one
faculty representative can make the policy decisions in question." 50 In ad-
dition, the Board distinguished department chairpersons at Fordham from
those at C.W. Post. Finding that other faculty members at Fordham
viewed chairpersons as representatives of the faculty, rather than of the
administration, the Board refused to exclude them as supervisors.5 ' Thus,
in Fordham, by including departmental chairpersons in the faculty unit,
the Board seemed to focus on another supervisory requirement - that au-
thority be exercised in the interest of the employer.
52
Without departing from its position in C. W Post and Fordham, the
Board, for the first time, in Adelphi University, admitted its difficulty with
applying rules governing industrial employees to the university setting.
53
48. Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1971). See Kahn, supra note 8, at 121.
49. Kahn, supra note 8, at 121.
50. Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. at 135.
51. Id at 138. Additionally, the Board noted that: (1) tenure, promotion, and appoint-
ment decisions were not made by chairpersons alone but by the faculty of the department as
a group; (2) chairpersons views reflected their superior knowledge and experience and not
the possession of authority as contemplated by the statute; (3) salary recommendations were
subject to review at three levels of authority; and, finally, (4) that chairpersons views were
not conclusive. Id Member Kennedy dissented in part, finding the chairpersons' situation
at Fordham "substantially akin to that at C.W. Post." Id. at 140. See note 46 supra.
52. See note 27 supra. Accord, University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974)(faculty
not supervisors under Act because collegial decisionmaking not exercised in the interest of
employer). This rationale has been severely criticized since many believe that faculty and
university interests are one and the same. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 68, quoted in NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 700-01. Since much faculty authority is directed toward improv-
ing educational and institutional excellence to attract better students and faculty, it is argued
that improved academic status benefits both the scholar and the administration. But see
Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 257 n.26 (1975) (faculty and institutional interests
may not always be synonymous, particularly where financial limitations curtail academic
programs).
53. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). The Board for the first time also
applied its 50% rule to determine if the department chairpersons were supervisors. This rule,
which originated in an industrial context, states that a supervisor of nonunit employees will
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Rather than arguing that the entire faculty fell within the supervisory ex-
clusion, the Adelphi administration limited its challenge to members of the
personnel committee which decided matters of tenure, promotion, sabbati-
cals, and removal, as well as members of the committee responsible for
investigating faculty grievances. Recommendations of both committees
went to the board of trustees who almost always accepted them.54 Al-
though acknowledging that these committees had "considerable and effec-
tive authority with respect to a wide range of actions affecting the status of
the university's professional personnel," the Board refused to categorize
faculty committee members as supervisors. 55 Stopping short of declaring
the unique role of faculty in university governance and the Act's profes-
sional and supervisory provisions irreconcilable, the Board conceded that
the concept of collegiality does not "square with the traditional authority
structures with which this Act was designed to cope" and that a "genuine
system of collegiality would tend to confound us."' 56 The Board, neverthe-
less, justified its use of industrial principles by distinguishing the faculty
units in Adeiphi and Post from a genuine system of collegiality in which
ultimate authority rests with the peer group and not with the board of
trustees.5
7
Such frankness on the part of the Board in Adeiphi encouraged univer-
sity administrations to believe that the Board might reconsider its newly
established precedents. This belief, however, proved to be unfounded. In
New York University,58 the Board rejected an argument that the faculty's
participation on committees and in the faculty senate attested to their su-
pervisory authority. Reasserting that the supervisory issue was governed
by its decision in Post, the Board noted that any implication to the con-
trary in Ade/phi was unwarranted. 59 The Board reached this conclusion
be excluded from the Act's coverage only if the supervisory functions account for more than
50% of the employee's time. See Menard, supra note 4, at 951. See generally Great W.
Sugar Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 551 (1962).
54. 195 N.L.R.B. at 647, 648.
55. Id. at 648.
56. Id. In an important and controversial footnote, the Board noted that the delegation
of such functions to elected groups which, in the industrial setting, separated managerial and
employee interests, could jeopardize their existence under the Act. The Board, however,
refused to decide this issue in the context of a representation proceeding. Id., at 648 n.31.
57. Member Kennedy forcefully opposed the majority's failure to distinguish between
the faculty role in C W Post and Ade/phi. He noted that the Adelphi personnel committee
consisted of 11 members, whereas the entire 600 member faculty at C.W. Post shared per-
sonnel authority. See Note, supra note 23, at 84.
58. 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973).
59. Id. at 5. Alternatively, NYU argued that because it lacked control over the manner
in which the faculty carried out their primary educational responsibilities, the faculty fell
within the Act's independent contractor exclusion. See N.L.R.A. § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
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despite the fact that the university sought to distinguish itself as a "mature
university" rather than a mere teaching institution. This distinction is
grounded upon the notion that mature, academically superior institutions,
usually private four-year liberal arts colleges in which the faculty share
authority with the administration, are particularly ill-suited to the manage-
ment-employee dichotomy.60 Unable to detect any critical distinction be-
tween the faculty role at New York University and that of the faculties in
the earlier cases, the Board refused to deviate from precedent. 6'
The "mature university" distinction was again rejected by the Board in
Northeastern University, despite the university's attempt to demonstrate
that its faculty role was different and more extensive than those previously
examined by the Board. 62 In a discussion of faculty manage-
rial/supervisory status unequaled in any Board opinion, Member Ken-
nedy, concurring and dissenting in part, distinguished professional
authority from bureaucratic authority, finding that only the latter connoted
managerial status. Reasoning that basic policy decisions are made by
those with bureaucratic authority, he noted that professional authority is
necessarily exercised by experts in a particular field. He concluded that
Northeastern and many other universities have parallel authority struc-
tures: bureaucratic authority exercised by the administration and board of
trustees, and the professional authority exercised by the faculty.63
Thus, despite repeated attempts by universities to argue the inapplicabil-
ity of industrial precedents and to remove their faculties from the Act's
protections, the Board continued to reject the supervisory/managerial ar-
gument. Instead, it relied upon the evolving legal principles of the prior
cases - that the faculty are professional employees within the Act; that
their possession of quasi-supervisory authority on a collective basis does
not make them "individual" supervisors; that their authority is exercised in
(1976). Noting that educational courses were subject to certain university restrictions, the
Board found that the faculty members lacked independent freedom required for the exclu-
sion. See G. Bodner, supra note 47, at 12.
60. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 69-74.
61. New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4,5 (1973).
62. Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975). Northeastern also attempted to halt
the faculty's petition for certification under the "contract bar" doctrine by alleging that a
collective bargaining contract already existed on campus. The university argued that the
faculty senate was the elected bargaining representative and the faculty handbook the
equivalent to a collective bargaining agreement. The Board rejected this argument because
the faculty senate functioned in an advisory capacity and made recommendations totally
different from demands advanced by a union. Id. at 248. See generally Pollitt & Thompson,
supra note 46, at 220 n.194.
63. 218 N.L.R.B. at 257. This distinction was originally made in J. BALDRIDGE, POWER
AND CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY 114 (1971).
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their own interest, not in the interest of the employer; and that final au-
thority rests with the board of trustees. The Board has consistently relied
upon these four legal principles in faculty unit determinations, and to date
has never found them to confer managerial or supervisory status on the
faculty as a whole.
Six months after Northeastern, the identical language and case law was
cited in Yeshiva University in response to the managerial/supervisory ar-
gument.64 Unlike previous Board cases defining the status of faculty
under the Act, however, the Yeshiva decision was overturned on appeal. 65
II. NLRB V. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY: A QUESTIONABLE
INTERPRETATION
The decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University came as a surprise to mem-
bers of the academic community. The managerial/supervisory argument
was presumed settled since the Board had refused to reconsider its position
and its conduct had received tacit approval in the court of appeals.66 Ad-
ditionally, Board unit determinations are rarely disturbed on appeal. 67
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit made no effort to conceal its displeasure
with the Board's rigid application of industrial principles and demanded
that the Board's reasoning withstand "closer scrutiny. '68 After examining
the four legal premises dictated by precedent and applied in Yeshiva, the
court found the decision unsupported by the record and lacking in analy-
sis.
First, the court assailed the Board's premise that full-time faculty are
professional employees as conclusory. 69 Although acknowledging that the
64. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054 n.5.
65. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212
(1979).
66. See note 19 supra. In Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. July 11, 1978)(No. 78-67), the court noted
that the Board's transfer of its private industry rules to the university setting was natural and
consistent with the common law method of applying time-tested legal principles to new situ-
ations.
67. See note 21 supra. Particularly during the past 15 years, courts of appeals have
rarely overturned Board determinations regarding nonmanagerial status. See Barney, supra
note 31, at 378. Cf NLRB v. Mercy College, 536 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1976)(Board's unit
determination receives more than usual weight).
68. 582 F.2d at 702 n.21, 703. The Second Circuit first announced this "closer scrutiny"
test in Niagara Univ. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1977), which involved the
exclusion of religious faculty from a bargaining unit.
69. The court reasoned that the Board had never found professional status per se to
preclude managerial status. 582 F.2d at 697. Although the court's point is technically cor-
rect, the Board cases cited to support this position are distinguishable because they involved
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faculty's discretion over their courses and teaching put them squarely
within the professional inclusion, the court found that the faculty's exten-
sive control over curriculum, admissions, tuition, rank, salary and tenure
matters also excluded them as supervisory/managerial personnel.70 Not-
ing the tension between the professional inclusion and the supervisory ex-
clusion, the court refused to accept the Board's rationale that while the
activities at Yeshiva might suggest supervisory/managerial status in other
contexts, they did not in an educational institution.7' Finding the legal
justification for such a distinction unclear, the court concluded that in ad-
dition to exercising professional expertise, the faculty were "substantially
and pervasively operating the enterprise. '72
The Second Circuit was even more critical of the Board's position that
the collective authority of full-time faculty precluded a finding of supervi-
sory/managerial status. It was noted that in Adelphi, the Board had con-
ceded that its position arose not from precedent, but from "its puzzlement
in attempting to apply to the unique university governance structure terms
which were designed to cope in the typical organizations of the commercial
world."' 73 Acknowledging that a literal reading of the "individual" lan-
guage in the supervisory exclusion would not encompass the collective
control exercised by the faculty either in concert or through committees,
the court nonetheless was troubled by the Board's failure to explain its
rationale. 74 The court noted that although collective supervision was not
considered by Congress, group action frequently is encountered in modern
corporate decisionmaking. 75 Consequently, it reasoned that excluding in-
dividuals exercising collective authority as supervisors is an equally realis-
tic construction of the Act.76 The court, however, chose not to resolve this
point, there being no "individual" requirement in the concept of manage-
professionals who supervised nonprofessionals more than 50% of their time. See note 53
supra.
70. 582 F.2d at 697-98.
71. Id. at 697 n. 13. The court observed that the Board had been "less than rigorous" in
categorizing individuals as supervisors or managers where professional employees are in-
volved. Id. at 695 n. 10; see notes 108-11 and accompanying text infra.
72. 582 F.2d at 698.
73. Id. at 698 n.14. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
74. 582 F.2d at 699.
75. Id.
76. Id. Professor Finkin argues that the Act requires the vesting of individual authority
and that the fact that collective judgments will not result in supervisory status is neither
novel nor unique to higher education. See Finkin, supra note 8, at 619 (citing National
Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1966)(functions of deskmen in editing copy and deter-
mining content of broadcasting material are but part of a group effort for news production
and do not render them supervisors)). But see Kahn, supra note 8, at 95, 129 (there is no
citable precedent for the Board's collective authority approach first taken in C W. Post).
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rial employees. 77
The court also evaluated the Board's criterion that full-time faculty act
on their own behalf rather than in the interest of the employer. In an
attempt to expose the differences in university-faculty interests, the Board,
in its brief, focused on the distinction between professional and bureau-
cratic authority.78 The Board emphasized that faculty members cooperate
for their mutual benefit in exercising their professional discretion collec-
tively; that the weight and respect accorded the faculty's views in their
areas of expertise are independent of their position in university govern-
ance; and that any input in the areas of personnel and budget similarly
arises from their professional concern with the academic quality of the
institution.79 The court, however, was unconvinced by the Board's efforts
to show that collegial action by peers in regard to their own conditions of
employment was a circumstance peculiar to institutions of higher learning
and not action in the interest of the university employer.80 Instead, the
court offered one commentator's assessment of the way in which universi-
ties such as Yeshiva function, positing that there is no bright line between
the interests of administrators and faculty whose common goal is to better
the institution as a place of learning.81 Even assuming that the faculty's
determinations on personnel, curriculum, admissions and other policy is-
sues were motivated by their own best interests, the court concluded that
the fact that the board of trustees rarely interfered in faculty decisions in-
dicated that the interests of the faculty and the university were almost al-
ways coextensive.8 2
Finally, the court summarily dismissed the Board's rationale that faculty
are not supervisory/managerial employees because final authority rests in
the board of trustees. The court reasoned that in industry, control by a
77. 582 F.2d at 699. Although disapproving the Board's statutory interpretation of
"employee" status for a group not contemplated by the Act, the Yeshiva court did not hesi-
tate to adapt the statute to a similarly unanticipated group-modem corporate decision-
makers.
78. NLRB Brief, supra note 33, at 23. See text accompanying note 63 supra. The
Board again highlighted this distinction in its petition for certiorari. See NLRB Petition for
Certiorari at 20-21, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 1212 (1979) (although playing an important role in devising curriculum and standards
and selecting its own members, faculty do not generally advocate management's interests
nor are they advised that they are management's representatives in making their decisions)
[hereinafter cited as NLRB Petition].
79. NLRB Brief, supra note 33, at 23.
80. 582 F.2d at 700.
81. 582 F.2d at 700-01 (quoting Kahn, supra note 8, at 68). See note 52 supra.
82. 582 F.2d at 700. But see NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 24 (faculty-administra-
tion agreement is the result of a continuous process of discussion, negotiation and compro-




board of directors never precluded the Board from finding supervi-
sory/managerial employees. 83 Furthermore, the court noted that this ra-
tionale conflicted with statutory language of the supervisory exclusion
which, by reference to those who have power "effectively to recommend,"
envisioned review by some higher authority.84
Thus, intently critical of the Board's dogmatic reliance upon industrial
legal principles, the court invalidated them, one by one, and found the
full-time Yeshiva faculty to be managerial employees excluded from the
Act's protection. From a strictly mechanistic perspective, the Second Cir-
cuit's decision is arguably correct, given the overlap between the duties of
professional, supervisory, and managerial employees, as well as the unique
role of faculty in university governance. Nonetheless, the supervi-
sory/managerial criteria are meaningless unless they are examined in light
of the realities of the employee's work environment and the policies of the
Act. In reviewing the Board's interpretation of faculty status under the
Act, the court failed to evaluate these important considerations.
The outcome in Yeshiva and other university cases is influenced by
whether or not the decisionmaker perceives faculty collective bargaining as
a tool to strengthen university governance or as a weapon which will ulti-
mately destroy it. There are widely divergent views on this issue. Some
believe that collective bargaining and concepts of shared authority unique
to university governance can co-exist, that the Board can accommodate its
labor principles to the academic's unique status, and that existing govern-
ance mechanisms can be improved through collective bargaining.8 5
Others believe that collective bargaining creates an adversary relationship,
antithetical to notions that common educational interests supercede divi-
sions between faculty and administration in a university community.86
Concomitantly, the latter view assumes that no adversarial relationship
presently exists.
In its decision, which closely parallels both the legal and policy analysis
of an amici brief submitted by several private universities8 7 and which
83. 582 F.2d at 701.
84. Id. at 702. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1177 (2d
Cir. 1968) (power to recommend promotion is not actually power to promote, thus promo-
tion recommendations will always be subject to review).
In its petition for certiorari, the Board asserts that it used the trustee rationale to show
similarities between management of a university and a corporation and to distinguish the
university from the true collegial model. See NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 25.
85. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 8, at 610-12.
86. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 8, at 68.
87. See Brief for Amici Universities, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1978) cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
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cites extensively to one commentator, Kenneth Kahn,88 the court appears
to adopt the latter view. This position that collective bargaining and uni-
versity governance are irreconcilable is grounded upon the Act's exclusiv-
ity principle. The Act provides that a representative chosen by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
"exclusive representative" and obligates the employer to bargain solely
with that representative. 89 Critics of faculty collective bargaining fear the
requirement of exclusivity will impair the ability of faculty members to
work through existing internal structures to consult with the administra-
tion over institutional policies. Furthermore, they predict that the threat of
an unfair labor practice charge would constrain administrations from deal-
ing with faculty senates and committees over anything resembling a term
or condition of employment.9°
Such a position, however, fails to take into account the enormous flex-
ibility of the bargaining process itself and ignores a body of literature sup-
porting the opposite conclusion. While there is seemingly a conflict
between a group of people sharing governance with the administration and
bargaining with it, evidence suggests that the conflict may be more theoret-
ical than factual.9' To date most collective bargaining agreements negoti-
ated by faculty unions have expressly retained the collegial decision-
making machinery in effect prior to the contract.92 One critic suggests that
the goal of faculty organizing is not to replace existing mechanisms, as the
Yeshiva court perceives it, but to establish a more meaningful role in the
existing governance structures. 93 Thus, the court's assumption that facul-
ties will bargain away faculty governance or that there is a necessary con-
flict between bargaining and governance is only arguably correct. 94
Further, the court's premise that bargaining is inappropriate in a univer-
sity setting due to the autonomous position of university professors and the
common goals of faculty and administrator is likewise subject to challenge.
88. 582 F.2d at 697 n.13, 698, 699, 701, 702, 703 & n.23.
89. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944).
90. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 158. See also Duquesne Univ., 198 N.L.R.B. 891 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Bloustein, A Chamber of Horrors?in THE EFFECTS OF FACULTY COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING ON HIGHER EDUCATION 110, 115 (R. Hewitt ed. 1973).
92. Comment, supra note 2, at 513. See J. Begin, Faculty Governance and Collective
Bargaining: An Early Appraisal at 10 (Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service
Special Report No. 5, Mar. 1974)(available from ACBIS, 1818 R Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20009).
93. See Nielsen, supra note 20, at 10.
94. See Amicus Brief of the American Association of University Professors at 30,
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as AAUP Briefi.
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Emphasizing the degree of independence enjoyed by faculty members "en-
tirely unknown among the professionals in private industry,"95 the court
quoted a 1925 decision that noted, "[b]y practice and tradition the mem-
bers of the faculty are masters and not servants. ' 96 The court, however,
neglected to ascertain whether this were true in 1925 and if so, whether it
continues to be true in 1978.
Examination of university faculty's current role suggests that this ideal-
ized concept of shared authority, originating in the Middle Ages97 is inap-
posite today. By the early 1970's, faculties had encountered an
accelerating reversal in their circumstances akin to the experience of work-
ers during the Depression. With declining financial contributions to
American colleges and universities, faculty salaries have decreased both in
terms of real income and in comparison with workers in general. 98 Since
the 1973-74 academic year, academic salaries have continued to be out-
stripped by the consumer price index, and the gap widens each year.99
Additionally, the current surplus of doctoral holders as well as a steady no-
growth rate of employment in higher education are projected to continue
into the 1990's.'00 These projections have resulted in the adoption of
measures to modify tenure, release tenured faculty, and cut back curricula,
all of which exacerbate faculty-administration relations.' 0' Adopting the
university's version of shared authority, the court ignored facts in the pres-
ent case which pointed to this opposite trend. Recently, the Yeshiva
faculty has experienced an increased teaching load, diminished sabbati-
cals, a lower retirement age, 0 2 postponed tenure decisions, more part-time
95. 582 F.2d at 700.
96. Id. at 698 (citing Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. 328, 336-37, 148 N.E. 539,
541 (1925). The quotation was taken out of context since in its entirety it stated that "mem-
bers of the faculty are masters, and not servants, in the conduct of the classroom." 240 N.Y.
at 336-37, 148 N.E. at 541 (emphasis added).
97. 582 F.2d at 701. The court failed to mention that shared authority based on the
European model historically has never been practiced in American colleges and universities.
Founding groups organized colleges in America from the top down by establishing boards
of managers to hire and fire teachers, appoint and dismiss presidents, and basically run the
enterprise. See Nielsen, supra note 20, at 4. Furthermore, the academic's demands for free-
dom, tenure, and a role in decisionmaking were at first strongly opposed by university presi-
dents and trustees. See AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 5.
98. AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 8.
99. Hagengruber, Reasons Why Faculty Members Accept or Reject Unions in Higher Ed-
ucation: The University of Wisconsin Experience, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 53, 59-60 (1978).
100. AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 8.
101. Id. See Note, The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons of Financial Exigency,
51 IND. L.J. 417 (1976).
102. Section 3(a) of the 1978 Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act permits mandatory retirement of tenured faculty members between the ages of 65 and
69. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(d) (West Supp. 1978). While the Act raised the mandatory retirement
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personnel, the closing of a graduate school, and the cancelling of courses
considered cost-inefficient. 0 3
Accompanying its failure to consider economic realities, the court also
ignored the policies underlying both the Act and its exclusions. In formu-
lating the exclusions, Congress and the Court attempted to protect man-
agement's right to have supervisors and managers solely accountable to it
without divided loyalty to a union. Furthermore, Congress hoped to avoid
possible domination of the union by an employer's agents.'04 Although
the Board also failed to explicitly discuss these policies as a foundation for
rejecting the supervisory/managerial argument, its position is more com-
patible with legislative intent.
The Board, for the first time, in its petition for certiorari argues that the
"loyalty" rationale for the exclusions is anomalous in a faculty case.'05
Since faculty members are expected to exercise independent professional
judgment in academic and personnel matters, the dangers of divided loy-
alty that Congress sought to avoid through exclusion are minimized. 1 6
Similarly, the unique structure of faculty governance eliminates the issue
of union domination. Unlike industry, where power is held by few, all
faculty share authority in a university setting. The court's labeling of this
shared authority as managerial transforms the entire rank and file bargain-
ing unit into a large class of faculty managers. This classification thus ex-
tinguishes the employee bargaining unit whose members would be subject
to potential domination. 0 7
In contradistinction to the Second Circuit, the Board's position carefully
balances the Act's professional inclusion and the managerial exclusion.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Aerospace eliminated the
Board's option of putting managerial employees in a separate bargaining
unit, the Board has construed the managerial standard narrowly. 0 8 After
BellAerospace, if the Board did not reduce its findings of managerial sta-
tus, numerous employees, particularly professionals explicitly covered by
age in private industry to 70 and eliminated the retirement age for government employees, it
provided for early retirement of tenured faculty to alleviate the financial burden on educa-
tional institutions. S. REP. No. 493, 95TH CONG., IST SESS. 8-9 (1917), reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 983-84.
103. See Connolly, Faculty Members: Hired Hands or Managers? CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 25, 1978, at 38.
104. See Moore, supra note 23, at 49. See also text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
105. See NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 22.
106. NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 22.
107. See Comment, supra note 2, at 504.
108. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc. 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Com-
ment, supra note 24, at 116 (the term "managerial" has been restricted to high level execu-
tives who also qualify as supervisors); notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
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the Act, would have been excluded from the Act's protection. '0 9 Thus, the
Board's position in the university unit determination cases may reflect an
attempt, in light of Bell Aerospace, to ensure that professionals, both in
university and industry settings, are not unduly divested of the Act's pro-
tection. 1'0 Such a construction is especially critical, lest the employee who
is deemed supervisory/managerial be denied rights which the Act was
designed to protect. I
Additionally, the Board's C W Post position reflects its implicit adher-
ence to national labor policy: to eliminate labor relations instability "by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining."" 12 Since
a contrary decision in C W Post would have been tantamount to sounding
the death knell for faculty collective bargaining, the Board may have con-
cluded that absent controlling statutory provisions excluding faculty, a na-
tional labor policy of promoting collective bargaining should control.' 13
Although the Board's failure to adequately offer these policy considera-
tions to support its decisions on faculty status no doubt invited judicial
review of its mechanical application of traditional rules, '14 its position, un-
109. See generally Barney, supra note 31, at 376.
110. The Board elaborated on this point in a post-Bell Aerospace case which it cited
throughout its brief in Yeshiva. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58
(1974), citedin NLRB Brief, supra note 33, at 17, 20, 23, 25, 27 (conferring managerial status
on professional employees whose independent job responsibilities did not make them true
representatives of management would eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor
and management).
I I. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970) (Board has duty to employees not to construe supervisory status too
broadly since employee who is deemed supervisory is denied statutory protection).
112. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See Comment, supra note 2, at 504.
113. Comment, supra note 2, at 505. See also Mack, The University Faculty and the Bar-
gaining Unit in LABOR RELATIONS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 9, 19
(T. Tice ed. 1972). But cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979)
(absent clear expression of Congressional intent to exercise jurisdiction over teachers in
church-operated schools, Court will not construe the Act so as to implicate sensitive first
amendment questions).
114. Despite the lack of clarity on the Board's part, it is highly questionable whether the
court was justified in invoking "closer scrutiny." The Board's inclusion of faculty within the
Act's coverage arguably is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and should have been
upheld. See notes 21 and 67 supra. It is clear that the issue of faculty status was not contem-
plated when the statute was enacted. It, however, is the Board's role to interpret and apply
the statute to new factual situations and its factual findings as to employee status are entitled
to great weight. See Stop & Shop Co. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1977). Even Kahn
acknowledged that the Board "probably did not exceed its discretion" in its determination
that faculty are neither supervisory nor managerial employees. See Kahn, supra note 8, at
180. In its decision, the court indicated that it not only disagreed with the Board's position
but also with its administrative procedure. The court suggested that rulemaking rather than
adjudication would be the appropriate method to explore the "special problems" created by
the Board's assumption of jurisdiction. 582 F.2d at 703. But see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (it is the Board's decision whether or not to
proceed by rulemaking or adjudication). See also note 38 supra.
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like the court's, is consistent with the underlying policies of the exclusions
and the Act.
Finally, the court's position can be criticized for creating inequitable re-
sults. Yeshiva suggests that the Board must distinguish between degrees of
shared authority at the nation's universities in order to draw a line to de-
lineate faculty supervisory/managerial status. In addition to decreasing
predictability, resulting in time consuming and costly litigation,, '5 such a
distinction would also create a paradoxical situation wherein the powerless
faculty would be able to seek an influential role through collective bar-
gaining while the more influential faculty, who had already secured a role
through institutional concessions, would be denied the means to protect
that role from erosion." 6 Furthermore, the decision not only unduly dis-
tinguishes between gradations of faculty authority, it also impermissibly
distinguishes between classes of employees vis-a-vis their employer.' 17 Of
all university employees, including professional employees, only the full-
time faculty as a class is denied collective bargaining rights. In view of
decreasing economic resources for educational institutions, any conces-
sions won by blue and white collar groups through collective bargaining
may disadvantage the faculty for whom no countervailing bargaining right
would exist. " 8
An open question after Yeshiva is the breadth of the court's holding and
its effect on existing and future faculty collective bargaining. While the
Second Circuit took pains to emphasize the narrowness of its holding,, 19
the decision lends itself to a broader interpretation and provides ammuni-
tion for university administrations that oppose union organization. The
Yeshiva court based its holding on the fact that in many instances the full-
time faculty effectively recommended the hiring, promotion, and tenure of
other faculty; it adopted the grading, graduation, curriculum, and admis-
sions requirements of their respective schools; and in particular cases, it
115. See AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 20-22. Cf Kahn, supra note 8, at 65 n.3 (higher
education in the United States is not a monolithic industry . . .[no institution is a carbon
copy of another).
116. See AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 20-22. Additionally, the position of part-time
faculty members with rights under the Act would be enhanced. See NLRB Petition, supra
note 78, at 26 n.22.
117. See note 41 supra.
118. AAUP Brief, supra note 94, at 22-23.
119. The court described in detail the practices of each of the academic schools at
Yeshiva and stressed that its decision was strictly limited to the facts as revealed by the
evidence: "[ojur function is not to examine in vacuo the governance procedures of all four-
year private institutions of higher learning described in the briefs of the amici universities as
'mature' institutions of higher education." 582 F.2d at 696 (emphasis in original). Yet, the
court immediately noted that many institutions have adopted governance procedures in
which the faculty play a decisive role in developing institutional policy.
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controlled the hiring of deans, the physical location of a school, the teach-
ing loads, and even the tuition to be charged. Although the amici universi-
ties stressed that an insignificant number of currently represented faculty
would be affected by a decision labeling faculty at "mature" universities as
supervisory or managerial, in reality the faculty in the prior Board cases
held similarly significant positions in developing both educational and in-
stitutional policy. ' 20 Accordingly, in its recently filed petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Board asserted that the elements of faculty responsibility
upon which the court determined managerial and/or supervisory status
are essentially the same as those found in other universities.' 21 This sug-
gests that Yeshiva not only undermines prior Board decisions, but may
also pose a threat to current collective bargaining on the nation's cam-
puses. 122
III. CONCLUSION
In its struggle to promote collective bargaining rights for a group of em-
ployees whose functions refuse to fit neatly within the industrial frame-
work, the National Labor Relations Board has performed less than
satisfactorily. Principally, the Board has failed to elucidate reasons under-
lying its conclusion that the faculty are within the Act's protection. At the
same time, the Board's admissions concerning its difficulty in reconciling
the Act's provisions with the system of university governance have aggra-
vated its vulnerable position. As a result, the Second Circuit in Yeshiva,
influenced by critical commentary and its own assumptions regarding the
120. Brief for the Amici Universities, supra note 87, at 6 n.5. See cases cited in note 9
supra. Cf. NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 557 (1st Cir. 1975) (court cited the
NYU, Adephi; Fordham, and C. W Post cases as instances in which the faculties had a
substantial role in personnel and educational policy matters).
121. NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 26 n.22.
122. See NLRB Petition, supra note 78, at 27 (Yeshiva decision, if left standing, will
create uncertainty as to whether faculty bargaining units at other educational institutions are
entitled to the Act's protection and may jeopardize the stability of numerous established
bargaining relationships.) See also Nielsen, supra note 20, at 4 (if the Yeshiva arguments
are legitimized in the private sector, the same ones will be raised by every public institution
in the country.) Relying on Yeshiva, university administrators could refuse to negotiate new
contracts when existing ones expired. Such action by universities may lead to an increase in
faculty strikes and possible congressional action. Should Congress choose to clarify the am-
biguity concerning faculty status, it could amend the supervisory exclusion to ensure that
faculty are protected under the Act. A recently enacted California public employee law
could serve as a model. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3562(m) (West Supp. 1979) provides in perti-
nent part: "[n]o employee or group of employees shall be deemed to be managerial employ-
ees solely because [they] participate in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum,
personnel and other matters of educational policy." In order to provide similar protection
against faculty managerial status, Congress would first need to amend the NLRA to incor-
porate case law managerial concepts.
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relationship between faculty and administrators, discarded the Board's le-
gal precedent and removed the full-time Yeshiva faculty from the Act's
coverage under the managerial exception.
The Supreme Court could sustain the ruling in favor of Yeshiva on the
basis of the Second Circuit's findings, that the university's structure actu-
ally embraces the total full-time faculty as managers or supervisors. On
the other hand, the Court could choose to look beyond the Yeshiva faculty
and address the broader question of faculty status in a university setting.
In either situation, the Court would be ill-advised to uphold the Second
Circuit's reasoning since it undermines the rationale for excluding employ-
ees from the Act's protection and ignores the realities of university life
today.
If the Yeshiva holding is to be undone, the Board must make a concerted
effort before the Supreme Court to highlight the consistency of its position
with the basic policies underlying the Act and its exclusions. Additionally,
the Board must avail itself of economic data to support its position that
university and faculty interests are often divergent and disguised by an
aura of "shared authority." If the Board fails to reveal the weaknesses in
the court's approach, the result may be an increasing disenfranchisement
of university faculty employees.
Felice Busto *
• Faculty collective bargaining is of particular interest to the author and other law
students of Catholic University. On August 17, 1977, subsequent to a Board-conducted elec-
tion, the Law Faculty Bargaining Committee was certified as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of a unit composed of the full-time law faculty at Catholic University. As in
Yeshiva, the university administration refused to bargain with the union, thereby commit-
ting an unfair labor practice in violation of the Act and forcing the Board to apply to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to enforce its bargaining order. Catholic
Univ., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 122, (June 20, 1978) applicationfor enforcement pending, NLRB v.
Catholic Univ., No. 78-2297 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 1978).
While characterizing the Committee as a "hybrid of management functions," the univer-
sity's principal contention in defending its refusal to bargain is that a separate unit of law
school faculty, rather than the entire university faculty, is inappropriate. In an industrial
setting, if either a separate or overall unit would be appropriate, the Board has adopted a
general policy against fragmenting employees into multiple bargaining groups. See Note,
supra note 23, at 85. In the university context, however, the Board has held a bargaining
unit limited to law school faculty appropriate since allegiance to a particular discipline could
transcend the "community of interest" shared with other university faculty. See Syracuse
Univ., 204 N.L.R.B.641, 643 (1973). Accord Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971); Uni-
versity of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973); cf. University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B.
423 (1976)(medical school faculty excluded from university-wide bargaining unit). Univer-
sities opposing a separate unit composed of professional school faculty thus find themselves
in the incongruous position of asking the Board to apply its industrial principles without
accounting for the unique attributes of faculty members.
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